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THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT ACT AND ITS POTENTIAL
EFFECTS UPON MARYLAND LANDLORD-
TENANT LAW
Steven G. Davisont
The author examines the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, which is currently being considered for adoption
by the Maryland General Assembly. The Act codifies the recent
judicial tendency to treat the landlord-tenant relationship as
one governed by contract principles rather than by the
principles governing the conveyance of estates in land. The
article's major emphasis is on the potential impact of the Act on
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,'
through its enactment of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act (hereinafter referred to as the "URLTA" or the "Act"),2 has been
a leading force in statutory reform of landlord-tenant law governing
residential leases.
Since 1972, the URLTA has been adopted either in its entirety or in
major substance in eight jurisdictions: Alaska,3 Arizona,4 Florida,'
Hawaii,6 Kentucky,7 Nebraska,' Oregon,9 and Virginia.1" In addition,
Washington" and Ohio 12  have adopted statutes that draw heavily
from the URLTA.
1. This organization is comprised of approximately 250 of the nation's leading lawyers,
judges and law professors, appointed by each state to draft state laws and establish
uniformity among state laws.
2. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, URLTA, (U.L.A.) (Supp. 1975), was
approved and recommended for enactment by the Commissioners at their annual
conference in 1972. URLTA (U.L.A.) Historical Note (Supp. 1975). The Act was
approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1974 mid-year
meeting at Houston, Texas, on February 4-5, 1974. Id.
The work of the Commissioners was based on a Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code drafted by the American Bar Foundation, which is the research arm of the American
Bar Association. See J. LEVI, P. HABLUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG, J. WHITE, MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 3 (Tent. Draft 1969). The Commissioners heard from
representatives of such diverse interests as owners, managers, mortgagees, savings and loan
institutions and banks, as well as tenants, tenants' unions, legal aid groups, and poverty
law groups.
3. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1962).
4. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301-1381 (1957).
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.63 (Supp. 1975-76).
6. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 521-1-76 (Supp. 1974).
7. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 383.505-.715 (1974).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1401-1449 (Supp. 1974).
9. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 91.700-.865 (1974).
10. VA. CODE 1950, §§ 55-248.2-.40 (Supp.1975).
11. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010-.040 (Supp. 1974).
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01-.19 (Supp. 1975).
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The URLTA is being studied by the Maryland Governor's Commis-
sion on Landlord-Tenant Law Revision, which has the authority to
prepare bills recommending enactment of the URLTA in whole or in
part by the Maryland General Assembly. 3 This article will examine the
present Maryland law governing the duties and remedies of residential
landlords and tenants, and will analyze the changes that would be
effected by the adoption of the URLTA.' 4
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW
The common law of landlord and tenant was derived from feudal
property law during the early Middle Ages, when England was a rural
agrarian society.'" Most leases involved the lease of rural land to tenant
farmers.' 6 A rental agreement between a lessor of agrarian land and a
tenant farmer was considered to be, in essence, a conveyance of an
estate in land; the conveyance of any buildings on the land was
13. The Governor of Maryland was authorized by the 1970 Regular Session of the Maryland
General Assembly to establish this Commission to study reform of Maryland landlord-
tenant law and to recommend necessary legislation. MD. H.R.J. Res. 63, Regular Sess.
(1970).
14. In several Maryland counties, certain areas of landlord-tenant law are governed by public
local law or by county ordinance rather than by public general law enacted by the
Maryland General Assembly. Montgomery County, MONTGOMERY Co., MD., CODE Ch. 29
(1972), and Prince George's County, PRINCE GEORGE'S Co., MD. CODE Ch. 10 (1973),
specify the duties and remedies of landlords and tenants, and regulate lease provisions.
Each of these counties has established an Office of Landlord-Tenant Affairs and a
Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs to regulate the licensing of landlords of
residential premises and to investigate and resolve disputes between landlords and
tenants. Both counties also have rent control ordinances.
Chapter Nine of the Baltimore City Code contains provisions governing retaliatory
eviction, PuB. L. L. OF MD. art. 4, § 9-10 (1974), rent escrow, Id. § 9-9, holdover
tenants, Id. § 9-14, termination of tenancies, Id., and summary eviction for failure to
pay rent due and payable, Id. § 9-2-8. These provisions of the Baltimore City Code are
substantially the same as the Maryland public general laws governing retaliatory eviction.
MD. ANN. CODE, 'Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1975); rent escrow, Id.§ 8-211
(Supp. 1975); holdover tenants and termination of tenancies, Id. § 8-402 (Supp. 1975)
amending § 8402 (1974); and summary eviction for failure to pay rent due and payable,
Id. § 8-401 (Supp. 1975). Baltimore County, BALTIMORE Co. CODE, ch. 16 (1968),
allows for the summary eviction of tenants for failure to pay rent due and payable; the
procedure is similar to that provided by the Maryland public general law. Public local law
prohibits and makes unenforceable, in Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County,
liquidated damages or penalty clauses in leases for residential premises, and limits the
amount of damages that may be recovered by the landlord from the tenant who vacates
the premises before the end of the term or who fails or refuses to take possession of the
premises. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-212 (Supp. 1975), requires landlords of
residential premises in Anne Arundel County to give a tenant a receipt if he pays rent in
cash, Id. § 8-205 (1974), and prohibits retaliatory evictions in Montgomery County, Id.
§ 8-206 (1974).
The URLTA could be enacted either on a state-wide basis as a public general law or
on a county-by-county basis as a county ordinance or as a public local law enacted by
the Maryland General Assembly.
15. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 198-213 (5th ed. 1966).
16. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 54-67 (5th ed. 1966).
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considered incidental to the conveyance of the land. 7 Thus, as one
court has stated, "in traditional analysis, a lease was the conveyance of
an interest in land, [and] courts have usually utilized the special rules
governing real property transactions to resolve controversies involving
leases."" Although the duties of parties to contracts are usually
mutually dependent, the duties of landlord and tenant under written
leases have traditionally been considered to be independent.'" Thus,
the tenant was liable for the full rent even though the landlord had
breached an express or implied covenant of the lease agreement.2 °
In the United States today, most leases involve city dwellers seeking
residential apartments. The language of a recent case, Javins v. First
National Realty Corp. 21 reflects the status of the modem residential
tenant.
The value of the lease is that it gives [them] a place to live. The
city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the third floor
of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below,
or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of
his apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and
poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known package of
goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.22
The urban residential tenant is more akin to a buyer of goods and
services than was the early agrarian tenant farmer in England. The lease
he signs will often contain numerous clauses giving it a "predominantly
contractual ingredient.",2 3 In recognition of the needs of this type of
tenant and lease, some courts have recently begun to reappraise the
common law of landlord and tenant and to apply modem contract law
to the construction and interpretation of residential leases.2 4
17. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 221 [1] (1966).
18. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
19. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ].
20. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11. However, the tenant was released from the
duty to pay rent when the landlord breached either the implied covenant to deliver
possession or the implied covenant not to disturb the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the
premises. Id.
21. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
22. Id. at 1074.
23. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 22111] at 179 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265
A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See also
notes 60-71, infra.
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
recognized these developments and incorporated many of them into the
URLTA, which reflects some basic changes in the underlying philos-
ophy of landlord-tenant relations. The URLTA is a comprehensive
statute attempting to correct the inequities that have resulted from
application of the common law to residential landlord-tenant relation-
ships in modem urban society.2" The express purpose of the Act2 6 is
to simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing the rental
of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlords2 7  and
tenants.28
The URLTA grounds the lease agreement on modem contract
principles and makes the obligation of the tenant to pay rent
conditional upon the landlord's fulfillment of certain obligations,
among which is the duty to deliver and maintain the premises in a
condition that complies with housing code standards for health and
safety.2 9 Other principles of modern contract law are applied to leases
for residential premises, including an obligation for both the landlord
and tenant to deal in good faith,3" a general obligation to mitigate
damages when the other party breaches the lease agreement,3 1 and a
prohibition against enforcement of unconscionable lease provisions.
3 2
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (URLTA)
The URLTA is applicable to rental agreements3 3 for residential
dwelling units34 located within a state, whether the agreement was
25. URLTA § 1.102, Comment.
26. URLTA § 1.102.
27. "Landlord" is defined by the URLTA to include a sublessor. URLTA § 1.301(5).
28. "Tenant" is defined as "a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling
unit to the exclusion of others," URLTA § 1.301(14), and thus would include a
sublessee or assignee of a tenant.
29. URLTA § 2.104.
30. URLTA § 1.302. "Good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct of the
transaction concerned." URLTA § 1.301(4). Section 1.106 of the URLTA authorizes
good faith settlements of disputed claims arising under the Act or rental agreements.
31. URLTA § 1.105(a).
32. URLTA § 1.303.
33. Section 1,301(11) of the URLTA defines "rental agreement" as "all agreements, written
or oral, and valid rules and regulations ... embodying the terms and conditions
concerning the use and occupany of a dwelling unit and premises."
34. Section 1.201 of the URLTA states that the URLTA is applicable only to leases of
"dwelling units." "Dwelling unit" is defined by Section 1.301(3) of the URLTA as
a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping
place by one person who maintains a household or by 2 or more persons who
maintain a common household.
Section 1.202 of the URLTA does not mention mobile homes. When a mobile
home is rented primarily for residential purposes, it would presumably be covered by the
URLTA. Although Section 1.301 of the URLTA (General Definitions) does not mention
"mobile homes," the definition of "dwelling unit" in Section 1.301(3) could be
construed to include mobile homes.
1976] URLTA
252 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5
executed within or without the state." Specifically excluded from
URLTA coverage are those rental agreements in which residence is
incidental to another primary purpose, such as residency in a prison,
hospital or college dormitory. Present Maryland law also distin-
guishes between residential and non-residential rental agreements. 7
There are sound reasons for adopting a statue applicable only to
residential rental agreements. The URLTA is reform legislation which is
The Maryland retaliatory eviction law, MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1
(Supp. 1975), specifically applies to mobile home park owners and operators and mobile
home dwellers. Should Maryland adopt the URLTA, specific coverage of mobile home
parks, where "tenants" own their mobile homes and rent space in the park, as opposed
to rental of a mobile home itself, could be insured by reference in either Section 1.202
(Scope and Jurisdiction) or in Section 1.301 (General Definitions). It may be considered
more appropriate, however, to enact a separate statute dealing with mobile home park
landlord-tenant problems, as has been done in California, CAL. ANN. Civ. CODE
§§ 789.5-.11 (1972), as amended (West Supp. 1975); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN., CIv.
PRAC. & PROC. §§ 83.69-.72 (Supp. 1975-76); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS 140,
§§ 32J-Q (Supp. 1974); and New York, N.Y.R.P. LAW § 233 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
The 1975 Regular Session of the Maryland General Assembly considered such a bill. H.B.
459 Regular Sess. (1975). H.B. 459 passed both the House and Senate, but in slightly
different versions, and so was not enacted. A similar bill, S.B. 14, has been filed in the
1976 Regular Session of the Maryland General Assembly. For a general treatment of the
mobile home issue, see Note, The Community and the Park Owner Versus the Mobile
Home Park Resident: Reforming the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 52 BOSTON U.L.
REv. 810 (1972).
35. URLTA § 1.201. Section 1.203 of the URLTA provides for jurisdiction and service of
process against landlords residing outside the state based upon their in-state ownership of
property. Present Maryland law also provides for "long-arm" service of process in
situations covered by Section 1.203 of the URLTA. MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Jud.
Proc. Art., § 6-103 (1974).
36. Section 1.202 of the URLTA provides:
[Exclusions from Application of Act.] Unless created to avoid the
application of this Act, the following arrangements are not governed by this Act:
(1) residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention
or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar
service;
(2) occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of
which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to his
interest;
(3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the
portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization;
(4) transient occupancy in a hotel, or motel [or lodgings [subject to cite
state transient lodgings or room occupancy excise tax act] 1;
(5) occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is
conditional upon employment in and about the premises;
(6) occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a
proprietary lease in a cooperative;
(7) occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the
occupant primarily for agricultural purposes.
The Comment to Section 1.202 of the URLTA specifies that the URLTA "applies to
roomers and boarders but is not intended to apply to transient occupancy. In many
jurisdictions transient hotel operations are subject to special taxes and regulations and,
where available, determinations under such authority constitute appropriate criteria."
37. Maryland's landlord-tenant legislation is found MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art.,
§§ 8-101 et seq. (1974) [hereinafter referred to as the "Maryland Real Property
Article."] Many aspects of landlord-tenant relationships, however, are not addressed by
this statute; in these areas Maryland generally follows the common law.
intended to remedy the problems imposed on modern urban residential
landlords and tenants by outmoded legal theories.3 8 The problems are
aggravated by a housing shortage that places the parties to a rental
agreement in an unequal bargaining position.3 9  In the case of
commercial leases, however, a presumption of equal bargaining power is
usually valid, and the parties are more likely to draft an equitable
agreement despite the inequities in their positions. These different
problems encountered by residential and commercial tenants in their
relationships with their respective landlords require different legal rules
governing their rights, duties and remedies.
IV. LANDLORD'S DUTIES AND TENANT'S REMEDIES
A. Landlord's Duty to Deliver and Maintain the Premises in a Habitable
Condition
1. Common Law
Under the common law, in the absence of a contrary lease provision,
the landlord had no duty to deliver and maintain the premises in a safe
and habitable condition. 40  This rule was based on the common law
doctrine of caveat emptor, and had as its premise the concept that the
tenant could inspect the premises, and enter into a rental agreement or
look elsewhere. 4 '
Subtitle Two of Title Eight of the Maryland Real Property Article is applicable
only to "residential leases," a term which is not defined. Subtitle Two contains
provisions regarding security deposits, MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203 (Supp.
1975), amending § 8-203 (1974); retaliatory eviction, Id. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1975); rent
escrow, Id. § 8-211 (Supp. 1975); prohibited lease provisions, Id. § 8-208 (Supp. 1975);
and mitigation of damages, Id. § 8-207 (1974).
Subtitles One, Three and Four of Title Eight of the Maryland Real Property Article
apply to landlord-tenant relationships in general and are not restricted to residential lease
agreements. Sections 8-115 and 8-116 pertain to agricultural tenancies.
Section 8-110(a) (Redemption of certain reversions) may provide some guidance as
to the definition of "residential" leases for landlord-tenant purposes in Maryland. This
Section "does not apply to leases of property leased for business, commercial,
manufacturing, mercantile or industrial purposes or any other purpose which is not
primarily residential, where the term of the lease, including all renewals provided for,
does not exceed 99 years." A lease of an entire condominium, co-operative or other
building for multiple-family use on the property is defined as having a business and not a
residential purpose. The term "multiple-family use" is defined as excluding "any duplex
or single-family structure converted to a multiple-dwelling unit."
The application of particular sections of Title Eight of the Maryland Real Property
Article to residential leases will be discussed as appropriate in the course of this article.
38. See text accompanying footnotes 15-24 supra.
39. The unequal bargaining position between residential landlords and tenants is due also to
the tendency of urban residential landlords to use standardized leaseforms, developed by
landlords' associations and organizations.
40. Smith v. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92 (1901); Gluck v. Mayor of City of Baltimore, 81
Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.45, 3.78.
41. Smith v. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92 (1901). See also In re Barnett, 12 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1926); Pierce v. Pierce, 351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N.E.2d 107 (1953).
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There were some exceptions to this application of the doctrine of
caveat emptor to tenants: the common law did require the landlord to
deliver residential premises in a safe and habitable condition in the case
of a short-term lease of furnished premises;4 2 or where the premises
were under construction at the time of the execution of the lease
agreement.4 3 The common law also recognized an exception where the
landlord had fraudulently concealed the condition of the premises from
the tenant prior to the execution of the rental agreement;44 or where
the defects were known to the landlord and could not be discovered by
the tenant upon reasonable investigation and inspection of the
premises.4" These exceptions were recognized because in each of these
circumstances, tenants could not be expected to discover the defects by
inspecting the premises prior to entering into the lease agreement.4 6
The common law did impose upon the landlord the duty to
guarantee the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises.47 This implied
covenant prohibited the landlord and his agents from interfering with
a tenant's enjoyment, use and possession of the premises. 48 However,
the landlord was not responsible for the acts of wrongdoers such as
other tenants who were not his agents or employees.4 9 Under the
doctrine of constructive eviction, ° the landlord's breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment justified the tenant in ceasing to pay rent,
if he first abandoned the premises and terminated the lease.5 ' Some
courts extended this doctrine, holding that a landlord can construc-
tively evict a tenant by failing to provide essential services such as heat,
water or electricity. 2 Most courts, however, have held that a tenant's
only means to escape liability for payment of rent under the doctrine
of constructive eviction is to vacate the premises and terminate the
42. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1892); Young v. Povich, 121
Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1922).
43. Gay v. Tate, 251 S.W. 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); J. D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), overruled on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Comm.
App. Tex. 1933). See Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059 (1910).
44. Smith v. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92 (1901).
45. Id.
46. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1892).
47. Sigmund v. Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868).
48. Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17
A.2d 130 (1941).
49. Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716 (1917).
50. Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236 (1875); See Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727
(N.Y. 1826).
51. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Il. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930);
Giddings v. Williams, 336 Ill. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929); Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N.Y.
345, 24 N.E. 716 (1890).
52. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930);
Giddings v. Williams, 336 Ill. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929). But see Rhynhart, Notes on the
Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD. L. REv. 1, 25 (1960), stating that Maryland joins
the majority of states in declining to adopt the theory that constructive eviction serves to
suspend the tenant's duty to pay rent.
lease; if the tenant continues to reside in the premises, he continues to
be liable for payment of rent. 3
The common law imposed no implied duty on the landlord to repair
or maintain the premises after the tenant took possession. 4 Although
the rental agreement could expressly impose this duty upon the
landlord, 5 the tenant usually was obligated to pay rent despite the
landlord's breach.5 6 The tenant's only remedy was to counterclaim
against the landlord for damages for breach of this covenant when the
landlord sued for rent due and payable. 7
Recently some courts, reflecting a changing attitude toward land-
lord-tenant relations, have imposed affirmative duties upon landlords to
deliver and maintain residential rental premises in a safe and habitable
condition. In Brown v. Southall Realty Co.," the District of Columbia
Court of Municipal Appeals held that a lease is subject to the principles
of contract law, and that a lease is void when executed by a landlord
who has knowledge that the premises contain defects constituting
violations of housing code regulations regarding the habitability and
safety of the premises.5 9 Under these circumstances the tenant is not
required to pay rent to the landlord.6" Brown does not recognize an
implied warranty of habitability, however, and thus only the tenant
who vacates the premises is released from the duty to pay rent. The
Brown decision does not provide a remedy for the urban dweller who
cannot afford to vacate or who does not want to vacate. When the
contract is declared void, due to the violation, the tenant becomes a
tenant at sufferance who can be evicted by a landlord after notice to
quit.6 1
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,62 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia solved the inadequacies of the
Brown remedy by holding that the tenant whose landlord breaches the
implied warranty of habitability may either abandon the premises or
remain in possession and have his rent reduced by an appropriate
53. See Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD. L. REV. 1, 23 (1960),
citing Wagner v. White, 4 H.&J. 465 (1815).
54. Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 A. 496 (1902).
55. Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md. 212, 100 A. 507 (1917).
56. Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922). However, if the parties intended to
make the covenant to repair and the covenant to pay rent interdependent, the tenant
would be released from his duty to pay the rent upon the landlord's breach. Id.
57. Tyson v. Weil, 169 Ala. 558, 53 So. 912 (1910); Hausman v. Mulheran, 68 Minn. 48, 70
N.W. 866 (1897); Pewaukee Milling Co. v. Howitt, 86 Wis. 270, 56 N.W. 784 (1893).
58. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mun. App. 1968).
59. The court held that the lease was void under the rule that contracts executed in violation
of a public statute or ordinance are void. Id. at 837.
60. Id. at 835.
61. Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Mun. App. 1969). After the
lease is declared void and the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance, a landlord may not
give notice to quit and sue for repossession for retaliatory reasons. Robinson v. Diamond
Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 362-83
infra.
62. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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amount.6 3 The Javins court further held that duties imposed upon the
landlord under the implied warranty of habitability may not be waived
by the tenant or shifted by the rental agreement,6 4 and that the
implied warranty of habitability exists not only at the beginning of the
tenancy, but also during the term of the rental agreement.6"
Other courts6 6 have recognized an implied warranty of habitability
that requiries a landlord to deliver the premises, and to maintain them
during the term of the rental agreement, in a safe and habitable
condition. These courts have found a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability when substantial violations of housing and building codes
occurred or when defects existed that substantially affected the health,
safety, or well-being of a tenant. For example, a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability has been found when the landlord failed to
provide heat, hot water, or essential services;6" or when the premises
were infested by rodents.6 On the other hand, leaks in water faucets,
cracks in walls, or unpainted walls (or other conditions affecting the
aesthetics or amenities of the premises) do not constitute a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability according to some decisions.6 9
Many of the courts that recognize the warranty of habitability have
also recognized, like Javins, that the landlord's breach of duties
imposed by the implied warranty of habitability entitles the tenant to a
choice of remedies, including the right to terminate the lease,7" and the
right to abatement of part or all of the rent.7
63. Id. at 1082-83.
64. Id. at 1081-82.
65. Id. at 1081. Javins reached this result after holding that urban residential rental premises
are subject to a warranty of habitability implied from housing code regulations and
measured by the standards set forth in the housing code during the term of the lease, and
that these leases should be interpreted and construed under contract principles. Id. at
1075.
The first court to hold that a landlord has an implied duty to deliver the premises
in a habitable condition was the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The Pines court departed from the common law principle
of caveat emptor, ruling that the premises are subject to a warranty of habitability
implied from local housing and building codes, which requires the landlord, at the
inception of the lease, to deliver the premises in a habitable condition. The court held
that the tenant's duty to pay rent and the landlord's duty to deliver habitable premises
are mutually dependent, and that a breach by the landlord of his duty relieves the tenant
from liability for payment of rent. Where the landlord is in breach, the tenant may
vacate the premises and terminate the lease, and is liable only for the reasonable rental
value of the premises during his actual occupancy.
66. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196
N.W.2d 850 (1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kline v. Burns,
111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973).
67. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
68. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
69. E.g., Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
70. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
71. Green v. Superior Court, .10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
2. Maryland Law
The Maryland courts have not yet recognized an implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases. However, Section 8-203.1(a)(2)(i) of
the Real Property Article of the Maryland Annotated Code does
provide a limited warranty "that the premises will be made available in
a condition permitting habitation, with reasonable safety ... ,"7' This
provision is limited by the fact that it may be modified or excluded by
the lease and is applicable only if a landlord "offers more than four
dwelling units for rent on one parcel of property or at one location
and... rents by means of written leases ....
Maryland's rent escrow statute74 also deals with the landlord's duty
to provide habitable premises. This Statute gives tenants remedies for
defects in the premises that present "a serious and substantial threat to
the life, health or -safety of the occupants." '7'  Enacted in 1975, the
rent escrow statute provides a variety of methods for dealing with
housing defects.7 6  The tenant, however, may not exercise these
remedies until he has given the landlord written notice of the defects
and a reasonable period of time to effect the repairs himself.77 Nor are
the remedies available to tenants who have previously received a
specified number of summonses for rent due and unpaid 71 or where
the defects are caused by the tenant, his family, agents, employees, or
social guests.7 9
When the landlord has failed to cure defects after notice and
opportunity to cure, the tenant may either bring a rent escrow action in
court, paying his rent into court,8 ° or raise the landlord's failure to act
as a defense in a suit for possession for non-payment of rent or in a suit
for rent due and unpaid.8 Whether the tenant raises this issue
affirmatively or defensively, the court is given wide discretion to order
appropriate relief, which may include termination of the lease,82
72. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203.1(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1975).
73. Id. This Section also requires that the lease set forth "[t]he landlord's and tenant's
specific obligations as to heat, gas, electricity, water, and repair of the premises." Id. This
duty may not be waived.
74. MD. ANN. CoD, Real Prop. Art., § 8-211 (Supp. 1975). This statute is based upon Pus.
L.L. of MD., art. 4, § 9-9 (1971).
75. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-211(a) (Supp. 1975). The Maryland statute
provides an inexhaustive list of defects that meet these standards including lack of heat,
light, electricity, hot or cold running water, adequate sewage disposal facilities, and
presence of paint containing lead pigments. Id. §§ 8-211(e)(1)-(6). On the other hand,
the Section specifically excludes a remedy for certain defects, such as small cracks in the
walls, floor or ceiling, conditions reducing the aesthetic value of the premises, lack of
linoleum or tiles on the floors, or the absence of air conditioning. Id. §§ 8-211(f)(1)-(4).
76. This statute applies to all publicly and privately-owned residential dwellings, but not to
farm tenancies. Id. § 8-211(c).
77. Id. § 8-211(h).
78. Id. § 8-211(k)(3).
79. Id. § 8-211(1).
80. Id. § 8-211(k)(2).
81. Id. § 8-211(i).
82. Id. § 8-211(m)(1).
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abatement of rent, 83 or payment of the rent escrow to the landlord,
the tenant, or a court-appointed administrator to effect the necessary
repairs.84
3. URLTA
The URLTA accepts the implied warranty of habitability doctrine as
defined by Javins,8" providing in Section 2.104 a warranty of habitabil-
ity arising at the inception of the tenancy and continuing until its
termination, which requires the landlord to deliver and maintain the
premises in a habitable condition. The landlord's liability under the
URLTA and lease provisions is relieved at the time of a good faith sale
to a bona fide purchaser. 86 Section 2.104 follows the pattern set in
Javins by requiring that landlords comply with local building and
housing code provisions materially affecting health and safety. The
landlord is required to comply with the stricter standards of the
housing and building codes when they impose greater duties than those
specified by Section 2.104.7
The specific duties imposed upon landlords by the URLTA are found
in Section 2.104(a)(4) and include a duty to: maintain and repair
electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and
other services provided by the landlord; 8 provide and maintain
receptacles for waste and to arrange for its removal; 9 and provide
tenants with reasonable amounts of water and heat unless the dwelling
unit receives these services from an installation within the "exclusive
control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility
connection," or unless the landlord is not required by other law to
provide these services.9" Section 2.104(a)(3) of the URLTA adopts the
common law doctrine that the landlord is required to maintain
common areas in a safe and clean condition.
Although the landlord and tenant of a single-family dwelling unit
may agree in writing that the tenant will perform the landlord's duties
with respect to trash removal and provision of water and heat, as well as
perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodel-
ing," the URLTA specifies that these agreements must be entered in
good faith.92
83. Id. § 8-211(m)(3).
84. Id. §§ 8-211(n)(2), (3). Section 8-403 requires the tenant to pay rent into escrow of a
court or appropriate administrative agency where the tenant and landlord are before the
court in a rent due and payable summary ejectment action (Id. § 8-401) or a holding
over action where a long adjournment is ordered (Id. § 8-402).
85. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
86. URLTA § 2.105. A successor in interest would be subject to the landlord's duty to
maintain the premises of existing tenants in a habitable condition. See Id. § 1.301(5).
87. Id. § 2.104(b).
88. Id. § 2.104(a)(4).
89. Id. § 2.104(a)(5).
90. Id. § 2.104(a)(6).
91. Id. § 2.104(c).
92. Id.
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Landlords and tenants of any dwelling units other than single-family
residences also may agree that the tenant will perform specified repairs,
remodeling, alterations or maintenance tasks, provided that the
agreement is in good faith and supported by adequate consideration
and is in a writing separate from the lease.93 However, these
agreements may not require the tenant to perform work necessary to
cure building or housing code violations,9 4 may not diminish the
landlord's responsibilities and duties to other tenants on the
premises,9" and may not condition the landlord's performance of his
duties under the lease upon the tenant's performance of the separate
agreements.9 6 These URLTA sections have been criticized because they
require the landlord to continue providing services to a tenant who has
failed to perform his agreed tasks.9 7
The URLTA provides a tenant with a number of remedies when the
landlord breaches his duties under the rental agreement or under
Section 2.104 to maintain the premises.9 8 The remedies vary depend-
ing upon the seriousness of the hazard caused by the landlord's breach.
Section 4.101 of the URLTA provides that the tenant may terminate
the lease, subject to certain conditions, for any material non-com-
pliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or any non-compli-
ance with the warranty of habitability of Section 2.104 materially
affecting health and safety. In order to exercise this remedy, the tenant
must give written notice to the landlord specifying the acts and
omissions constituting the default and notifying the landlord that the
rental agreement will terminate not less than 30 days after his receipt of
notice if the breach is not remedied within 14 days.99 If substantially
the same breach recurs within six months, the tenant may terminate the
rental agreement 14 days after he has given written notice to the
landlord specifying the breach and date of termination."° ° This remedy
is not available for conditions caused by the complaining tenant or
other persons on the premises with his consent. 
1 0 1
In addition to terminating the lease, the tenant may recover damages
and obtain injunctive relief for any non-compliance by the landlord
with the rental agreement or with the landlord's obligation to deliver
93. Id. § 2.104(d)(1).
94. Id. § 2.104(d)(2).
95. Id. § 2.104(d)(3).
96. Id. § 2.104(e).
97. Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARiz. L.
REV. 79, 113 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 79].
98. The URLTA does not require a tenant to elect a remedy unless he proceeds under
Section 4.104, in which case he may not proceed under Section 4.101 or 4.103 with
respect to that breach. Id. § 4.104(c). In some circumstances, the tenant may utilize
several remedies in conjunction.
99. URLTA § 4.101(a).
100. Id. § 4.101(a)(2).
101. Id. § 4.101(a)(3). "If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all
security recoverable by the tenant under Section 2.101 and all prepaid rent." Id.
§ 4.101(d).
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and maintain a fit premises.' °2 If the landlord's non-compliance is
willful, the tenant may recover reasonable attorney's fees.' 3
Section 4.103 of the URLTA would provide an additional remedy by
changing the common law to authorize the tenant to have repairs made
himself when their cost is less than $100.00 or one half the periodic
rent, whichever i6 greater.' 0 4 If the tenant elects this remedy he must
give the landlord notice in writing of his intention to correct the defect
and give the landlord an opportunity to cure the defect.' 5 The
landlord must cure within 14 days or "as promptly as conditions
require in case of emergency." 1 0 6 Any repairs must be done in a
workmanlike manner, and must be reasonable.' 7 After submitting an
itemized statement to the landlord, the tenant may deduct the cost of
repairs from his next rent payment.' 8 This remedy is not available
when the condition is caused by the tenant, his family, or other persons
on the premises with his consent.' 9
Section 4.104 of the URLTA also provides a choice of specific
remedies for the landlord's willful or negligent failure to supply the
heat, water (hot or cold) or other essential services required by the
rental agreement or Section 2.104."10 Under this Section, the tenant,
after giving written notice to the landlord,"' may procure essential
services and deduct their reasonable cost from the rent," 2 recover the
diminution in the fair rental value of the premises, ' or procure
reasonable substitute housing during the landlord's non-compliance, be
excused from rent during this period," ' and collect damages for the
reasonable value of the substitute housing up to the amount of the
periodic rent, plus reasonable attorney's fees.' 's
These remedies differ from those specifically authorized by the
Maryland rent escrow statute in several respects. The tenant under
Section 4.104 of the URLTA does not have the option of affirmatively
paying his rent into a rent escrow fund in court. Furthermore, the
Maryland rent escrow statute does not require that the landlord act
willfully or negligently. The remedy under the Maryland statute is
102. Id. §§ 4.101(b), (c).
103. Id. § 4.101(b).
104. Id. § 4.103(a).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 4.103(a).
107. Id. Arizona requires that the repair be made only by a licensed contractor. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1363(A) (Supp. 1974).
108. URLTA § 4.103(a).
109. Id. § 4.103(b).
110. A tenant proceeding under Section 4.104 may not also proceed under Section 4.101 or
Section 4.103. Id. § 4.104(c).
111. No period for cure of the breach by the landlord is provided in this section.
112. URLTA § 4.104(a)(1).
113. Id. § 4.104(a)(2).
114. Id. § 4.104(a)(3).
115. Id. § 4.104(b).
based upon the condition of the premises alone." 6 The Maryland rent
escrow statute does not provide for damages or attorney's fees.
One criticism of Section 4.104 is that the landlord is required not
only to pay the cost of repairs but also to pay damages to his tenants
for their expenses in procuring substitute services.'' 7 This could force
or influence a number of landlords to forego repairs on their premises
and to abandon them, resulting in abandonment of a great number of
multi-unit residential dwellings, particularly in inner city areas where
landlords' profits are often marginal."' Maryland's rent escrow statute,
by requiring judicial supervision and authorization of repairs with rent
funds, seems to be more fair than the URLTA for both landlords and
tenants.
Under Section 4.105 of the URLTA, the landlord's non-compliance
with the rental agreement or the URLTA is a defense or basis for a
counterclaim in a landlord's suit for possession for non-payment of rent
or for unpaid rent while the tenant is in possession.' " Section 4.105(a)
authorizes the court to require the tenant to pay all or part of the rent
into court and to determine the amount due each party, thus impliedly
authorizing the court to abate or reduce the rent where appropri-
ate. 2 ' This procedure under Section 4.105 parallels the procedure
under the Maryland rent escrow statute where the tenant elects to
withhold his rent and raise the landlord's conduct as an affirmative
defense in a suit for possession for non-payment of rent, for collection
of unpaid rent, or for distress for rent. Under the Maryland rent escrow
statute, however, a defense is available only in situations where the
conditions of the premises substantially affect health and
safety.' 2 ' The Maryland rent escrow statute does not allow a tenant to
raise the landlord's conduct as a counterclaim in an action by the
landlord to recover possession or to collect rent due and payable. In
116. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-211(e) (Supp. 1975). Both the Maryland statute,
Id. § 8-211(1), and Section 4.104(d) of the URLTA provide no remedy to the tenant
when the condition was caused by acts of the tenant, his family, or guests.
117. Note, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.,
104 at 117.
118. Id. at 118.
119. URLTA § 4.105(a). "If the defense or counterclaim by the tenant is without merit and
is not raised in good faith, the landlord may recover reasonable attorney's fees." Id. In
the phrase "in an action for rent when the tenant is in possession" in Section 4.105(a), it
is not clear whether "possession" refers to "legal" possession or to actual physical
possession. ("Legal possession" means the right to possession under the lease during the
term of the lease.) The difference is important, because if the tenant has legal possession
he should be made to pay rent, even if he does not actually occupy the leased premises,
unless he has a valid counterclaim or defense against the landlord. On the other hand, if
the tenant has validly terminated the lease under the Act due to the landlord's
non-compliance with provisions of the rental agreement or the URLTA, but the tenant
continues to reside on the premises as a holdover tenant, the tenant should still be liable
for rent. See URLTA § 4.301(c), discussed in text accompanying notes 354-60 infra.
120. "In an action for rent when the tenant is not in possession, he may counterclaim as
provided in subsection (a) but is not required to pay rent into court." URLTA
§ 4.105(b).
121. See text accompanying notes 74-84 supra.
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addition, Maryland's rent due and payable summary ejectment
statute12 2 and holding over statute 23 do not specifically allow a tenant
to file a counterclaim against the landlord when the landlord brings an
action for possession or for rent.
If a landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from the
leasehold premises, or purposefully diminishes or interrupts essential
services (such as heat, water, electricity, or gas), the tenant has a
remedy under Section 4.107 of the URLTA 2 4 Section 4.107 appears
to codify the common law prohibition against constructive evictions of
a tenant by interrupting essential services. The tenant under Section
4.107 may recover possession or terminate the rental agreement, and in
both cases he may recover punitive damages up to three months
periodic rent or three-fold actual damages, whichever is greater, plus
reasonable attorney's fees. There is no such statewide statute in
Maryland, although the City of Baltimore has a statute specifically
prohibiting a landlord from reducing essential services. 2
Objection has been expressed to these provisions of the URLTA and
to the Maryland rent escrow statute on the grounds that they may
cause landlords to abandon residential rental dwellings because of the
extensive duties imposed upon the landlord to deliver and to maintain
residential rental premises in a safe and habitable condition. Except
with respect to the self-help remedies of Section 4.103 of the URLTA,
however, the URLTA and the Maryland rent escrow statute only apply
to conditions substantially or materially affecting the health and safety
of tenants, such as lack of heat, hot or cold running water, electricity,
and adequate sewage disposal facilities. Tenants should be entitled to
such basic necessities at a minimum as an implicit part of a lease
contract for the rental of residential premises.
Fear of abandonment of residential rental housing has not prevented
a number of states, either through court decision or legislative
enactment, from recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in the
lease of residential premises. The recently enacted Maryland rent
escrow statute, which provides similar remedies to those provided under
the URLTA, is modeled after the Baltimore City rent escrow
ordinance,"' which has been in existence for almost five years and has
apparently satisfied landlords and tenants as being fair legislation.
122. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-401 (1974).
123. Id. § 8-402 (1974).
124. URLTA § 4.107 provides a remedy for a landlord's violation of § 4.207, which
provides:
A landlord may not recover or take possession of the dwelling unit by action
or otherwise, including willful diminution of services to the tenant by interrupting
or causing the interruption of heat, running water, hot water, electric, gas, or
other essential service to the tenant, except in case of abandonment, surrender, or
as permitted in this Act.
125. PUB. L.L. OF MD., art. 4, § 39-15 (1971). Under this public local law, Baltimore City
may fine the landlord $50.00 or imprison him for 10 days, or both, for reducing the
essential services to which the tenant is entitled without the tenant's consent.
126. PUB. L.L. OF MD., art. 4, § 9-9 (1971).
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B. Landlord's Duty to Deliver Possession
Both Maryland1 27 and the URLTA 128 follow the majority English
rule requiring the landlord to deliver actual possession of the premises,
rather than the minority American rule requiring the landlord only to
convey the legal right to possession, with no obligation to ensure actual
possession when third parties wrongfully exclude the tenant.'29
In Maryland, when the landlord fails to provide the tenant with
possession of the dwelling unit at the beginning of the term of the lease,
the rent abates until delivery of possession. 3 ° Maryland authorizes a
tenant to terminate the lease when his landlord fails to provide him
with possession at the beginning of the lease term, by giving the
landlord written notice before possession is delivered.' 3 ' When the
lease is terminated by the tenant, "the landlord is liable for all money
or property given as prepaid rent, deposit or security."' 32 In addition
to, or instead of, terminating the lease, the tenant may recover from the
landlord "consequential damages actually suffered by him subsequent
to the tenant's giving notice to the landlord of his inability to enter on
the leased premises. ,'133
The URLTA similarly provides that when the landlord fails to deliver
possession at the beginning of the term, the rent abates until possession
is delivered, 13 4 and the tenant may terminate the lease after giving the
landlord at least five days' written notice.1 3 The URLTA would
slightly weaken a tenant's rights in Maryland when the landlord fails to
deliver possession, since the tenant in Maryland may terminate the lease
immediately upon written notice after the landlord fails to deliver
possession at the beginning of the term. This difference, however, is not
material, because rent is abated until the landlord delivers possession
both under the Maryland statute and under the URLTA, and because
the landlord has no right under the URLTA to cure his breach after the
tenant gives him written notice.
Like the Maryland statute, the URLTA requires a landlord to return
all prepaid rent and security after the tenant terminates the
lease.136 Instead of terminating the lease, the URLTA authorizes the
tenant to recover possession and actual damages from the landlord,
after demanding performance of the rental agreement.13 7 The URLTA
would thus limit the tenant's remedies under the Maryland statute,
which authorizes a tenant both to terminate the lease and to recover
127. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-204 (1974).
128. URLTA §§ 2.103, 4.102.
129. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.37.
130. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-204(c) (1974).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 8-204(d).
133. Id. § 8-204(e).
134. URLTA § 4.102(a).
135. Id. § 4.102(a)(1).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 4.102(a)(2).
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actual damages from the landlord. Unlike the Maryland statute, the
URLTA also incorporates the tenant's common law' 38 right to recover
possession and actual damages from the person wrongfully in posses-
sion. 39
The URLTA also authorizes recovery of punitive damages in an
amount not more than three months' periodic rent or three times the
actual damages, plus reasonable attorney's fees, by an "aggrieved
person" from a person whose "failure to deliver possession is willful
and not in good faith."' 4 ° It is not clear, however, whether the URLTA
entitles the landlord or the tenant to recover punitive damages from the
person wrongfully in possession. The Maryland statute does not
authorize a tenant to recover punitive damages.
C. Landlord's Duty to Prevent Unsafe Conditions in Common Areas
The Maryland common law imposes on a landlord the duty to use
ordinary and reasonable care to prevent unsafe conditions in common
areas; the landlord's breach gives rise to an action for damages by an
injured party who was lawfully in the common area. 4 ' By providing
that remedies are to be administered so that aggrieved parties, including
138. See 25 AM. JUR. 2d Ejectment § 35 (1966).
139. URLTA § 4.102(a)(2).
140. URLTA § 4.102(b).
141. Langley Park Apts. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Elmar Gardens, Inc. v.
Odell, 227 Md. 454, 177 A.2d 263 (1962); Windsor v. Goldscheider, 248 Md. 220, 236
A.2d 16 (1957); see Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 298 A.2d 27
(1972).
Both Maryland and the URLTA prohibit the landlord from exculpating his tort
liability to persons injured in the common areas. The URLTA generally prohibits a rental
agreement from containing a provision that the tenant "agrees to the exculpation or
limitation of any liability of the landlord arising under law or to indemnify the landlord
for that liability or the costs connected therewith." URLTA § 1.403(a)(4). Maryland
makes void any lease provision that would exculpate the landlord from liability to any
tenant or other person injured in the common areas, MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art.,
§ 8-105 (1974), and authorizes recovery of actual damages and attorney's fees by a
tenant if a landlord tenders a lease to a tenant which contains a void provision or
attempts or threatens to enforce a void provision. Id. § 8-208(c)(2) (Supp. 1975).
Maryland, however, does not prohibit the inclusion in a lease of a void provision. Id.
§ 8-208(a).
A tenant also has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent unsafe conditions on the
premises that might injure third parties that is little different from the duty of any other
possessor of land. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328-44. Cf. Matyas v.
Suburban Trust Co., 257 Md. 339, 263 A.2d 16 (1970), where the court held that a
provision in a commercial lease that the tenant would clear ice from a sidewalk did not
entitle a person, who fell on ice and was injured while going to do business with the
tenant, to recover in tort against the tenant as a third party contract beneficiary for the
tenant's failure to perform this duty under the lease. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop.
Art., § 8-323 (1974), which authorizes a third party, whose goods are distrained and
sold under a distress for rent action by a landlord, to bring an action against the tenant
to recover damages. (Section 4.205(b) of the URLTA abolishes distress for rent.) The
text accompanying notes 252-59 infra, discusses the liability of a tenant to other tenants
and to neighbors for disturbing the enjoyment of their premises.
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third parties, may recover appropriate damages,' 42 the URLTA im-
plicitly affirms this common law rule and thus would make no change
in the Maryland law.
D. Landlord's Duty to Disclose
Although there is no common law authority requiring a landlord to
disclose to his tenants the name and address of the owner or manager of
the rental building, both the URLTA' 43 and Maryland statute1 44 re-
quire disclosure of this information, apparently so that tenants will
know who is responsible for the obligations imposed upon the landlord
by law and against whom to proceed.'
4
1
Maryland stipulates that the owner must post a sign listing the name,
address and telephone number of the owner or management entity in a
conspicuous place on residential rental property.' 46 This information
may be provided in the written lease or in the rental receipt, in lieu of
posting.' 47 Section 2.102 of the URLTA requires disclosure in writing
to the tenant of the names and addresses of the owner or his agent and
the manager of the premises at or before the commencement of the
tenancy, but does not otherwise specify how disclosure should be
made. The agent of a landlord who does not comply with the URLTA
disclosure requirements assumes the landlord's duties under the statute
and the rental agreement, including the duty to apply all rent collected
to maintain and repair the premises.' 48 A requirement that disclosure
be made in the lease and by posting would be a wise addition to both
the Maryland statute and the URLTA, since a tenant may misplace his
copy of the lease or may be a periodic tenant without a written lease.
There is no common law authority requiring landlords who rent by
means of written leases to provide copies of the lease form to
prospective tenants or to provide copies of the lease to tenants who
have executed the lease. In Maryland, a landlord "who offers more than
four dwelling units for rent on one parcel of property or at one location
and who rents by means of written leases" is required to provide a copy
of the lease form to any prospective tenant upon written request,
"without requiring execution of the lease or any prior de-
posit .... ""' The URLTA does not contain even this limited require-
ment.
Unless prospective tenants and tenants who have executed a written
lease are provided with a copy of the lease form they are unable to
properly review it and evaluate their rights and duties under the lease
and those of their future landlord. A requirement that a copy of the
142. URLTA § 1.105(a).
143. URLTA § 2.102.
144. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-210 (Supp. 1975).
145. URLTA § 2.102, Comment.
146. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-210 (Supp. 1975).
147. Id.
148. URLTA § 2.102(c).
149. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).
lease be made available would not impose an unreasonable burden upon
landlords if they are allowed to charge a reasonable fee for the copies
and if the landlord is not required to provide a copy of the lease form
until a prospective tenant has complied with reasonable application
requirements.'5 0 If the URLTA is adopted by Maryland, the Act
should be amended to include this requirement.
E. Security Deposits
Prior to the execution of the lease or entry into possession of the
premises by the tenant, landlords frequently require that the tenant
deposit with them money or other items of value to secure the landlord
against damages caused by any breach of covenants or conditions of the
lease by the tenant.' Courts have usually held that the relationship
between the landlord and tenant with respect to such a security deposit
is that of debtor and creditor,1 2 thus allowing the landlord to mingle
the security deposit with his own funds.5 3 Under this view, the tenant
has no preference in event of the landlord's bankruptcy.5 4 A few
courts, however, have viewed the relationship as that of pledgor and
pledgee, thus placing the landlord in a position of trust to the tenant
with respect to the handling of the security deposit.'
A related issue is whether the landlord or his assignee is liable for
return of the security deposit to a tenant after the landlord has
conveyed the reversion to an assignee. Courts are split as to whether the
original landlord or his assignee is liable to the tenant for the security
deposit under the common law.' 
6
A landlord will often attempt to keep the security deposit if the
tenant breaches or prematurely terminates the lease, by labeling the
security deposit as either "consideration" for the execution of the
lease"5 7 or "advance rent."'5 8 However, the courts have tended to
construe the security deposit provisions strictly and to interpret them
as liquidated damages clauses, which are not upheld if they appear to
impose a penalty. 9 If a liquidated damages clause is held invalid the
landlord is entitled to withhold only actual damages from the security
deposit. 
60
150. Reasonable application requirements should not include payment of any deposit or fee
for execution of the lease.
151. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73; 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 96-100.
152. E.g., Handle v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 316 Pa. 116, 173 A. 313 (1934). See
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73.
153. Id.
154. In re Banner, 149 F. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73.
155. E.g., Partington v. Miller, 122 N.J.L. 388, 5 A.2d 468 (1939). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.73.
156. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73.
157. See Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597 (1918). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.73; 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 98-100.
158. See Loew v. Antonick, 82 Ariz. 204, 310 P.2d 825 (1956); Schoen v. New Britton Trust
Co., 111 Conn. 466, 150 A. 696 (1930); Sinclair v. Burke, 133 Ore. 115, 287 P. 686
(1930). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73; 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 98-100.
159. See Burns Trading Co. v. Welborn, 81 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1936); Barrett v. Monro, 69
Wash. 229, 124 P. 369 (1912). A liquidated damages provision is held invalid as a penalty
when forfeiture occurs upon the breach of any of various covenants; when the amount of
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In response to these problems, both the URLTA"' and Mary-
land162 have enacted statutes that govern the amount, disposition and
return of security deposits. The URLTA allows money or property,
however denominated, to be required as a security deposit,'6 3 while a
security deposit under the Maryland statute is limited to mon-
ey.64 The URLTA limits the amount of the security deposit to one
month's periodic rent, 6 ' while Maryland limits the amount to the
larger of two months' rent or $50.66 The Maryland statute specifically
makes this a maximum amount for each dwelling unit, regardless of the
number of tenants in a dwelling unit.'6 7 The URLTA is unclear as to
this matter. The maximum security deposits under the URLTA and the
Maryland statute are essentially the same, however, since Maryland
permits a landlord to include payment of the last month's rent as part
of the security deposit, 6 ' while the URLTA does not include prepaid
rent within the definition of a security deposit.'6 9
Unlike the URLTA, the Maryland statute requires a landlord, if
requested, to give the tenant a list of all existing damages within 15
days of occupancy. 7 ° In Maryland, written leases or the receipt for the
security deposit must inform the tenant of his right to request this list
of existing damages.' 7 ' Both the Maryland statute'7 2 and the
URLTA' 73 require the landlord to provide the tenant with an itemized
accounting of any damages claimed by the landlord that are withheld
from the security deposit. The Maryland statute requires a statement of
"the cost actually incurred" by the landlord due to such dam-
ages, "'7 4 while the URLTA refers only to "accrued rent and the amount
of damages."' 7 " The URLTA requires that the itemized accounting and
the amount due the tenant from the security deposit after deducting
accrued rent and damages be delivered to the tenant within 14 days of
the termination of the tenancy; 7 6 the Maryland statute requires an
damages may be easily determined; when the amount of the security deposit
unreasonably exceeds the amount of probable damages; when the lessor has the option
of retaining the deposit as liquidated damages or of suing for damages; or when the
tenant is held liable for damages in excess of the amount deposited as liquidated
damages. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73; Annot., 106 A.L.R. 292 (1937).
160. English v. Richardson, 80 N.H. 364, 117 A. 287 (1922).
161. URLTA § 2.101.
162. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203 (Supp. 1975), amending § 8-203 (1974).
163. URLTA § 2.101(b).
164. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(a) (1974).
165. URLTA § 2 .101(a).
166. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(b)(1) (1974).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 8 -2 03(a) (1974).
169. URLTA § 2.101, Comment (Approved changes Aug. 1974).
170. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(d)(1) (1974).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 8-203(h)(1) (1974).
173. URLTA § 2.101(b).
174. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(h)(2) (1974).




accounting within 30 days after the termination of the tenancy 7 " and
requires the return of the amount due to the tenant within 45 days
after termination of the tenancy.878
The URLTA permits the landlord to apply the security deposit to
payment of accrued rent and to damages to the premises caused by the
tenant's failure to maintain the premises as required by Section
3.101.179 The Maryland statute, while permitting the landlord to apply
the security deposit to the payment of unpaid rent and to "damage to
the leased premises by the tenant, his family, agents, employees, or
social guests in excess of ordinary wear and tear,"' 0 also allows the
landlord to apply the security deposit to payment of damage due to
breach of the lease. 8 ' Under the Maryland statute, however, the
security deposit may not be forfeited as liquidated damages; 8 2 the
landlord is entitled to withhold only the damages caused by the
tenant's breach of the lease. 8 3 In calculating damages under the
Maryland statute, the landlord must consider any rent received from a
second tenant during the remainder of the term of the first tenant who
has abandoned the premises and failed to pay rent for the remainder of
the term. 8 4
The URLTA is unclear as to whether the landlord or his assignee, or
both, are liable to the tenant for the security deposit. Section 2.101(e)
provides that "the holder of the landlord's interest in the premises at
the time of the termination of the tenancy is bound" by Section 2.101.
This requirement may be interpreted to make the landlord's assignee
personally liable to the tenant for the security deposit even though the
initial landlord has retained it.' In addition, the URLTA continues to
177. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(h)(1) (1974).
178. Id. § 8-203(f)(1) (1974). Neither the URLTA nor the Maryland statute requires the
tenant to give the landlord notice of his change of address if he moves or abandons the
premises. This requirement should be included in a security deposit statute so that the
landlord will be able to fulfill his duty to give an accounting to the tenant. Maryland law
presently requires only that the accounting be sent to the last known address of the
tenant. Id. § 8-203(h)(1) (1974).
179. URLTA § 2.101(b). The text accompanying notes 235-51 infra discusses a tenant's
duties under Section 3.101 of the URLTA.
180. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(g)(1) (Supp. 1975). The Maryland statute is
less specific than Section 3.101 of the URLTA, which elaborately details a tenant's
duties regarding maintenance and upkeep of the premises. See text accompanying notes
235-51 infra.
Maryland gives a tenant the right to be present when the landlord or his agents
inspect the premises to determine if they were damaged. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop.
Art., § 8-203(g)(1) (Supp. 1975).
181. Id. § 8-203(g)(i) (Supp. 1975).
182. Id. § 8-203(g)(ii) (1974).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 8-203(g)(3) (1974). In Maryland, a landlord is also subject to a general duty to
mitigate damages when a tenant abandons the premises prior to termination of the lease.
Id. § 8-207 (1974). See text accompanying notes 411-12 infra.
185. An assignee who is held liable to the tenant under these circumstances presumably will
have an action against his assignor pursuant to Section 1.105(a) of the URLTA. Section
1.105(a) of the URLTA provides in pertinent part: "The remedies provided by this Act
shall be so administered that an aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages." An
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make the landlord liable to the tenant "for all security recoverable by
the tenant under Section 2.101 and all prepaid rent" after assignment
or conveyance of his reversion."8 6
The Maryland statute provides that any successor in interest is liable
to the tenant for failure to return the security deposit,"8 7 and also
places liability on the landlord without discharging him if he conveys to
a successor in interest.18 8 Thus, under both the Maryland statute and
the URLTA, the landlord and his successors in interest apparently are
jointly and severally liable for payment of the security deposit to the
tenant at the termination of the tenancy.
When the landlord wrongfully withholds the amount due, the
URLTA awards the tenant the amount of money or property due plus
reasonable attorney's fees and punitive damages in an amount equal to
twice the amount wrongfully withheld. 8 9 The Maryland statute
authorizes punitive damages up to threefold the amount withheld
"without reasonable basis" after 45 days from termination of the lease,
plus reasonable attorney's fees.' 90 The Maryland statute, however,
unlike the URLTA, also authorizes recovery of damages by the tenant
when the landlord requires a security deposit exceeding the maximum
authorized by statute; 9 ' when the landlord fails to provide a written
receipt to the tenant for the security deposit;' 9 2 and when the
landlord, after written request by the tenant, has failed to provide the
tenant with a written list of existing damages within 15 days of the
tenant's occupancy.' 93
assignee under these circumstances should be considered to be an "aggrieved party" who
is entitled to maintain an action for damages against his assignor.
186. URLTA § 2.105.
187. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 8-203(e)(3)--(4) (1974). In Maryland, security
deposits are free from any attachment by creditors. Id. § 8-203(e)(3) (1974).
188. Id. § 8-203.
189. URLTA § 2.101(c).
190. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-203(f)(4) (1974).
191. Id. § 8-203(b)(2) (1974). Punitive damages up to threefold the amount by which the
required security deposit exceeded the maximum authorized security deposit is
authorized, plus reasonable attorney's fees.
192. Id. § 8-203(c)(2) (1974). Damages in the amount of $25 are authorized.
193. Id. § 8-203(d)(2) (1974). Punitive damages up to threefold the amount of the security
deposit are authorized, subject to set-off for damages and unpaid rent that the landlord
"reasonably" could withhold from the tenant.
Section 8-203(h)(2) provides that the landlord forfeits the right to withhold any
part of the security deposit as damages when he fails to send an itemized list of the
damages claimed and actual costs incurred to the tenant within 30 days after termination
of the tenancy.
Section 8-208(c)(2) (Supp. 1975), authorizes a tenant to recover damages and
reasonable attorney's fees from a landlord who has included in the tenant's lease, or
attempted or threatened to enforce, any provision made unenforceable by the security
deposit statute. This Section does not indicate which lease provisions are considered to
be "unenforceable" under the security deposit statute; however, it might be interpreted
to afford a tenant damages when the landlord includes a provision that requires a larger
security deposit than the statute permits. A tenant, therefore, might be able to recover
damages under both Section 8-208(c)(2) and Section 8-203(b)(2) when a landlord
requires a security deposit in an amount greater than permitted by Section 8-203(b)(2).
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In addition to imposing penalties upon a landlord for failure to
account for security deposit money to a tenant, the Maryland statute
seeks to insure that the security deposit is not misappropriated for a
purpose other than "to protect the landlord against non-payment of
rent or damage to the leased premises."' 94 The landlord in Maryland
may not co-mingle security deposit funds with any other
monies. 9 Furthermore, he must give the tenant a receipt for the
security deposit' 9 6 and place the deposit in a banking or savings
institution within 30 days after he receives it.' 9 7
In addition, the Maryland statute requires a landlord to pay a tenant
three percent annual simple interest on security deposits over $50,
accruing at six month intervals.'9 " The URLTA fails to address the
question of the use and safeguarding of security deposit funds while in
possession of the landlord.
The Maryland statute on security deposits is more specific than the
URLTA in its requirements for collection of and accounting for
security deposit funds and imposes more detailed responsibilities and
restraints upon the landlord. Thus, if Maryland enacts the URLTA, its
security deposit provisions should be deleted and the present Maryland
statute retained.
V. TENANT'S DUTIES AND LANDLORD'S REMEDIES
A. Tenant's Duty to Pay Rent
The fundamental common law obligation of the tenant is to pay
rent.' 99 In the absence of an agreement as to the amount of rent, the
common law implies an agreement by the tenant to pay a reasonable
amount for the use of the premises.2 °0 The URLTA codifies the
common law rule, providing that in the absence of an agreement
between landlord and tenant, "the tenant shall pay as rent the fair
rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit."' 0 ' The
landlord and tenant may agree on any terms and conditions regarding
rent not prohibited by the Act.20 2 The amount and terms of payment
of rent, therefore, would be subject to the prohibition against
"unconscionable" provisions in a lease,2 °3 a limitation that would
194. MD. ANN. CODE, Real. Prop. Art., § 8-203(a) (1974).
195. Id. § 8-203(e)(1) (1974).
196. Id. § 8-203(c)(1) (1974).
197. Id. § 8-203(e)(2) (1974).
198. Id. §§ 8-203(f)(1)--(3) (1974). The difference between the "going" interest rate on the
security deposit (which the landlord may collect while he holds the deposit) and the
interest which the landlord must pay to the tenant while he holds the security deposit
presumably is intended to reimburse the landlord for the administrative costs involved.
Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-19 (Supp. 1974-75).
199. 11 Geo. II, c. 19, § 14 (1738); see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.64.
200. See Carpenter v. United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 489 (1873).
201. URLTA § 1.401(b).
202. Id. § 1.401(a).
203. Id. § 1.303.
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probably prohibit a landlord from charging an amount of rent that was
much above fair market value.
The URLTA provides that rent is payable "without demand or
notice" as agreed by the parties;. 4 if the parties have not agreed as to
the time for payment of rent, "periodic rent is payable at the beginning
of any term of one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly
installments at the beginning of each month."2 °5 This provision of the
URLTA changes the common law rule that rent is neither due nor
payable until the end of the rental period.20 6 The URLTA codifies the
common law rule20 7 that rent is payable at the dwelling unit if the
parties do not specify where it is to be paid. 0 8 Maryland has no
statutory provisions regarding the time and place for payment of rent,
and would presumably follow the common law.20 9
In Maryland, the landlord has two options when a tenant fails to pay
rent. First, he may bring a summary ejectment action to recover
possession of the premises and to recover rent due and unpaid. 210 The
hearing is held within five days of service of the summons and
complaint,2 ' and the tenant may be ordered to vacate the premises
within two days of judgment.2 12 This Maryland statute gives the tenant
the right to redemption of the leased premises by paying the landlord,
"at any time before actual execution of the eviction order," all rent due
and unpaid, plus late fees and court-awarded costs and fees.2 13
Secondly, the landlord has the remedy of distress for rent, which has
been codified into a highly detailed procedure.2 14 The landlord,
204. Id. § 1.401(c).
205. Id.
206. See 16 ARIZ. L. REv. 79, 89.
207. Id.
208. URLTA § 1.401(c).
209. Maryland does seek to protect tenants by requiring every landlord to "maintain a records
system showing the dates and amounts of rent paid to him by his tenant and showing
also the fact that a receipt of some form was given to each tenant for each cash payment
of rent." MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.2 (Supp. 1975). The URLTA
contains no such provision. Both the URLTA, § 2.102, and the Maryland statute, MD.
ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-210 (Supp. 1975), require the landlord to disclose to
the tenant, either in the lease or by posted sign, the name and address of the manager
and owner of the premises. These provisions protect a tenant who is required to pay rent
to the manager or owner. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
210. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-401 (Supp. 1975).
211. Id. § 8-401(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
212. Id. § 8-401(c)(3) (Supp. 1975). "The court may, upon presentation of a certificate
signed by a physician certifying that surrender of the premises within the two-day period
would endanger the health or life of the tenant or any other occupant of the premises,
extend the time for surrender of the premises as justice may require. However, the Court
may not extend the time for surrender of the premises beyond 15 days after the trial."
Id. § 8-401(c)(4) (Supp. 1975).
213. Id. §8-401(e) (Supp. 1975). This right of redemption is not provided to any tenant
"who has received more than three summons containing copies of complaints filed by
the landlord against the tenant for rent due and unpaid in the 12 months prior to the
initiation" of a rent due and payable suit. Id.
214. Id. §§ 8-301-32 (1974).
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through judicially supervised proceedings2 '5 may levy on the personal
property of the tenant 21 6 and sell as much as is necessary to pay the
past due rent.2 ' 7
The URLTA has abolished the common law remedy of distress for
rent,218 although it provides other remedies.
Section 4.201(b) provides a landlord with a remedy if the tenant fails
to pay rent when due and payable. The landlord may terminate the
lease21 9 and bring an action to recover possession and rent as well as
damages for the tenant's breach of the rental agreement, plus
reasonable attorney's fees. 22' This action, however, is not specified to
be a summary proceeding, as is the case in Maryland. 22 ' Before a
landlord may terminate the lease for non-payment of rent, he must first
give the tenant written notice of non-payment of the rent and of the
landlord's intention to terminate the rental agreement within 14 days
after the notice if the rent is not paid.22 2 If the tenant fails to pay rent
within 14 days after receipt of the written notice, the lease terminates
and the landlord has the right to initiate an action for possession, rent
and damages under Section 4.201(b), as discussed previously. If the
landlord knowingly accepts a late payment of rent from a tenant, the
landlord waives his right to terminate the lease on grounds of failure to
pay rent when due and payable, unless landlord and tenant agree
otherwise after the tenant has breached the lease.22 3
Since the URLTA procedure is not a summary proceeding, it would
be more favorable to tenants than the procedure delineated by the
current Maryland statute. The URLTA would also favor tenants by
abolishing the remedy of distress for rent. Further changes in the
Maryland law would be made by URLTA's requirement that the
landlord give the tenant written notice and a right to cure his breach
before filing a rent due and payable suit, and by its failure to grant the
tenant a right of redemption before actual execution of the eviction
order.
B. Fire or Casualty Damage to the Premises
Under the common law, the tenant was held liable for rent under his
lease even when the entire leased premises were destroyed by fire or
215. Self-help distress for rent is not permitted in Maryland. Id. § 8-309.
216. Id. §§ 8-309-26.
217. In a distress for rent suit in Maryland, the court may also terminate the lease and order
restitution of possession, Id. § 8-324, and enter a deficiency judgment if the distress sale
does not bring the amount of rent due the landlord. Id. § 8-325.
218. URLTA § 4.205(b).
219. Id. § 4.201(b).
220. Id. § 4.206.
221. See text accompanying note 210 supra.
222. Id. § 4.201(b).
223. Id. § 4.204. A landlord, therefore, cannot prohibit a waiver by a pre-existing lease
provision.
other casualty.2 24 Maryland has a statute2 25 changing the common law
doctrine, but it is not as clear or thorough as the URLTA in this area.
Maryland allows for the termination of the rental agreement when
"improvements on property" become "untenantable" by reason of fire
or "unavoidable accident" in leases of seven years or less.22 6
Section 4.106 of the URLTA would change the common law to
afford the tenant several remedies in case of fire or other casualty
damage to the leased premises. If the premises are destroyed or
damaged by fire or other casualty to such an extent that the tenant's
"enjoyment of the unit is substantially impaired," the tenant can
immediately vacate the premises and terminate the lease as of the date
of vacating by giving a written notice to the landlord, within 14 days of
vacating, of his intention to terminate the rental agreement.2 2 The
tenant may also continue to occupy the premises if he can lawfully 228
do so, vacating those parts of the premises made unusable by the
casualty, in which case "rent is reduced in proportion to diminution of
the fair rental value of the premises. '22 9 The URTLA, as does
Maryland, provides that where the lease is terminated, rent is to be
accounted for "as of the date of the fire or casualty."2 30 If the lease is
terminated, the tenant may recover all security recoverable under
Section 2.101 and all pre-paid rent.2 3 '
A major dissimilarity between Maryland's statute and Section 4.106
of the URLTA is that the premises must be "untenantable" under the
Maryland statute,2 3 2 which might require the premises to be damaged
to such an extent that they are totally uninhabitable, while the
premises only have to be "substantially" damaged under the
URLTA.2 3 3 The URLTA, however, does not further define the extent
of damage necessary before a tenant may invoke the remedies provided
under Section 4.106. The Maryland statute, by referring to "fire or
unavoidable accident," would be inapplicable when the tenant, his
family or his guests deliberately or negligently cause the fire or casualty
damage. The URLTA, however, does not specify that it is inapplicable
under these circumstances, although this might be implied.
The URLTA would provide the tenant a wider choice of remedies
than present Maryland law when the premises suffer fire or casualty
damage. The URLTA permits the tenant to continue to reside on the
224. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.103.
225. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-112 (1974).
226. Id.
227. URLTA § 4.106(a)(1).
228. This reference to "lawful" occupancy after damage or destruction to the premises
apparently refers to requirements of health, safety, fire or building codes that might
prohibit occupancy.
229. URLTA § 4.106(a)(2).
230. Id. § 4.106(b).
231. Id.
232. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-112 (1974).
233. URLTA § 4.106(a)(2).
1976 URLTA
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premises, subject to requirements of housing and health codes, and to
have the rent reduced when the premises are substantially damaged.
C. Tenant's Duty to Maintain the Premises
In the absence of an express covenant in the lease, the common law
prohibition against waste imposes on every tenant a duty to treat the
premises in such a way that they will revert to the landlord at the end
of the lease term uninjured, except for ordinary wear and tear, by any
willful or neglectful conduct of the tenant.2 3 4 Section 14-102 of the
Maryland Real Property Article allows the landlord either to bring an
action to recover damages from a tenant who commits waste or to
obtain an injunction to prohibit the tenant from committing waste.
Section 3.101(6) of the URLTA follows the common law by
prohibiting waste by a tenant.2 3
In addition to prohibiting a tenant from committing waste, the
URLTA requires the tenant to keep the leased premises clean and
safe;23 6 to properly dispose of garbage and waste;2 3 7 to keep plumbing
facilities "as clean as their condition permits. ,, and to use
heating, plumbing, sanitary, ventilating, electrical and other facilities
and appliances in a reasonable manner.23 9 The URLTA also requires
tenants to comply with provisions of local building and housing codes
"materially affecting health and safety. '240 Maryland has no similar
statute, although the Baltimore City Housing Code 241 and the Mont-
gomery County Code24 2 impose similar duties upon tenants with
respect to maintenance of the premises.
The landlord has three options under the URLTA when the tenant
breaches his duty to maintain the premises. When the breach creates a
condition "materially affecting health and safety that can be remedied
by repair, replacement of a damaged item, or cleaning," the landlord
may enter the premises to make the necessary repairs himself if the
tenant fails to do so "as promptly as conditions require in case of
emergency," or within 14 days after written notice from the landlord
requesting that the tenant remedy the specified breach within that
period of time.24 3 The repairs must be done in a workmanlike
234. Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 13 A. 370 (1888).
235. This Section provides that a tenant may "not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface,
damage, impair, or remove any part of the premises or knowingly permit any person to
do so...."
236. URLTA § 3.101(2).
237. Id. § 3.101(3).
238. Id. § 3.101(4).
239. Id. § 3.101(5).
240. Id. § 3.101(1).
241. PUs. L.L. OF MD. art. 4, ch. 9 (1969).
242. MONTGOMERY Co., MD., CODE § 29-29 (1973).
243. URLTA § 4.202.
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manner.24 4 After presenting an itemized bill to the tenant, the landlord
may add the reasonable cost of repairs to the next periodic rent
payment.2 4
The landlord may, on the other hand, terminate the lease where the
tenant's breach of his duty to maintain the premises under Section
3.101 creates a condition "materially affecting health or safe-
ty. ,,246 The landlord must first give the tenant written notice
specifying the breach and indicating that the lease will terminate at a
date not less than 30 days from receipt of the notice. 4 7 Unless the
tenant remedies his breach within 14 days of receipt of the notice
either by making repairs or by paying damages to the landlord, the lease
terminates as specified. 48 If the tenant commits substantially the same
breach within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental
agreement after 14 days written notice specifying the breach and the
date of termination.2 4 9
As the third option, the landlord may recover actual damages and
obtain injunctive relief where the tenant breaches his duty to maintain
the premises under Section 3.101."0 If the tenant's breach is willful,
the landlord may also recover reasonable attorney's fees. 2 1 The
landlord presumably could combine the second and third options to
recover damages as well as terminate the lease.
The URLTA would make a significant contribution to Maryland law
by specifying the tenant's duty to maintain the premises, and by
providing the landlord with remedies which are dependent upon the
seriousness of the tenant's breach.
D. Tenant's Duty Not to Disturb
Under the common law, the tenant's breach of a lease covenant
prohibiting disturbance of other tenants' enjoyment of their premises
was grounds for eviction by the landlord.2" 2 However, in Maryland, the
tenants whose enjoyment was disturbed might not be able to enjoin the
breaching tenant as third party contract beneficiaries.2" 3 In addition, a
244. Id.
245. If the tenancy is terminated, the landlord may demand immediate payment of the cost
or value of the repairs. Id.
246. Id. § 4.201.
247. Id. § 4.201(a).
248. Id. § 4.201(b).
249. Id. § 4.201(a).
250. Id. § 4.201(c).
251. Id.
252. See text accompanying notes 320-327 infra.
253. Maryland generally recognizes the principle of recovery by third party contract
beneficiaries, but it has not applied the principle in situations involving contracts
between landlords and tenants or between landlords and third parties. See Matyas v.
Suburban Trust Co. 257 Md. 339, 263 A.2d 16 (1970); Marlboro Shirt Co. v. American
Dist. Tel. Co., 195 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951) (lessee held not entitled to recover as
third party beneficiary against telegraph company which agreed with lessor to install and
maintain an automatic alarm sytem to signal leakage of water in sprinkler system, for
damages caused when sprinkler system activated and alarm failed to work).
tenant cannot terminate his lease because of the conduct of another
tenant disturbing his enjoyment of the premises; such conduct by other
tenants does not amount to constructive eviction unless the conduct is
supported or instigated by the landlord.2" 4 A tenant in a multi-unit
rental building, however, can enjoin another tenant from disturbing his
enjoyment if the other tenant's conduct amounts to a private
nuisance. 5 ' Maryland does not have any statutory provision for a
tenant's disturbance of other tenants.
Section 3.101(7) of the URLTA, however, prohibits a tenant and
other persons on the premises with his consent from disturbing other
tenants' peaceful enjoyment of their premises.25 6 Violation of this
provision might give disturbed neighboring tenants a cause of action
under Section 1.105 of the URLTA.25 7
The landlord's notice requirements for a tenant's breach of Section
3.101(7) "materially affecting health and safety," are found in Section
4.201.25" Even though the tenant's breach of Section 3.101(7) does
not materially affect health and safety, the landlord may recover actual
damages and obtain injunctive relief.2 9 The landlord presumably could
recover damages in addition to terminating the lease. By these
provisions the URLTA makes all tenants subject to a uniform duty not
to disturb other tenants and gives all landlords and tenants uniform
remedies against tenants who cause disturbances. This is preferable to
common law under which tenants who cause disturbances were subject
to eviction by a landlord only under a properly drafted lease provision
and to injunction or damages by neighboring tenants under the law of
nuisance.
254. Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716 (1917). But see Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Misc.
383, 130 N.Y.S. 231 (1911), which indicates that a landlord's failure to control the
other tenants' conduct which creates a nuisance in common areas constitutes
constructive eviction and allows the tenant whose enjoyment is disturbed to vacate the
premises and terminate the lease.
255. For a general discussion of the standards for determination of a nuisance, see 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1.23-25 (1956).
256. Section 3.101(7) can be criticized because "other persons on the premises with [the
tenant's] consent" could include the landlord or the landlord's employees. The wording
should be changed to exclude these persons.
257. The Official Comment to Section 1.105 provides that "in appropriate circumstances
rights and remedies may extend to third persons under this Act or supplementary
principles of law .. " Section 1.105 provides:
(a) The remedies provided by this Act shall be so administered that an
aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages. The aggrieved party has a duty
to mitigate damages.
(b) Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforceable by action
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.
258. See text accompanying notes 246-49 supra.
259. URLTA § 4.201(c). Where the tenant's breach of Section 3.101(7) is willful, the
landlord may recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to actual damages. Id.
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E. Tenant's Duty to Provide the Landlord with Reasonable Access to
the Premises
Under common law the tenant's possessory interest in the premises
was absolute even against the landlord and in the absence of a
reservation in the lease the landlord had no right to enter to make
repairs or to inspect the premises.2 6 °
Section 3.103 of the URLTA changes the common law by imposing
upon a tenant the duty to consent to reasonable access to the premises
by the landlord for the purposes of inspecting the premises, making
repairs or alterations, supplying services, or showing the premises to
prospective tenants or purchasers or to workmen or contractors. The
URLTA would permit the landlord to enter the premises without the
tenant's consent in an "emergency" situation, although such emergen-
cies are not defined.26 ' The landlord, however, may not abuse the right
of access or use it to harass the tenant,2 62 and it would appear that the
tenant could "reasonably" withhold his consent if the landlord or his
employees sought to enter the premises after normal working
hours.2 6 3 Although Section 3.103 requires the landlord to give the
tenant two days' advance notice before entering the premises except in
emergencies or where impracticable, the URLTA should be amended to
require the landlord or his employees to knock and announce their
presence before entering the premises even in an emergency in order to
protect the tenant's right of privacy.26 4
When the landlord has made an unlawful entry, a lawful entry in an
unreasonable manner, or repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful
but which unreasonably harass the tenant, the URLTA provides the
tenant with alternative remedies of injunctive relief or termination of
the lease, in addition to damages and reasonable attorney's fees.2 6 A
tenant's refusal to consent to lawful access by the landlord allows the
landlord to obtain injunctive relief or termination of the lease in
addition to damages and reasonable attorney's fees.26 6
Under the URLTA, the landlord may also enter the premises when
authorized by court order,2 67 when necessary to make repairs when the
tenant has failed to maintain the premises as required by Section 3.101,
in an emergency, or after 14 days notice from the landlord,26 8 when
reasonably necessary if the tenant is absent from the premises for a
260. See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 226 (1970).
261. URLTA § 3.103(b).
262. Id. § 3 .103(c).
263. The tenant's consent, however, would not be required in an "emergency" situation. Id.
§ 3.103(b).
264. See Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969).
265. URLTA § 4.302(a).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 3.103(d)(1).
268. Id. § 4.202;see Id. § 3.103(d)(2).
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period exceeding 7 days,2 69 or when the tenant has abandoned or
surrendered the premises.2 7 °
Maryland has no similar statute. Landlords in Maryland, however,
often reserve a right of access in the lease; adoption of the URLTA in
Maryland would protect tenants against unreasonable access by
landlords under such lease provisions.
F. Tenant's Absence from or Abandonment of the Premises
Common law gave the landlord three options 'when the tenant
abandoned the premises. 27 1 First, the landlord could consider the
rental agreement as still in effect and sue the tenant for unpaid rent as
each periodic rent payment became due and was not paid. 272 As a
second option under the common law, the landlord could consider the
rental agreement as remaining in effect after notifying the tenant that
he was not accepting surrender2 73 or that he was reletting the premises
for the benefit of the tenant.2 74 If the landlord exercised this second
option, he had to make reasonable efforts to relet the premises at a fair
rent.2 7 If the landlord could not relet the premises for the amount of
rent owed by the tenant, the landlord could sue the tenant for damages
measured by the difference between the rent due and payable by the
tenant and the rent received by the landlord for reletting the premises
for the remainder of the term.276 The third option under the common
law permitted the landlord to accept the tenant's abandonment as a
surrender of the lease, thus terminating the lease and prohibiting the
landlord from recovering either future rent or damages from the
tenant.2 77
Maryland has abolished the landlord's first option under the common
law where the tenant abandons the premises and now requires a
269. Id. § 4.203(b); see Id. § 3.103(d)(2).
270. Id. § 3.103(d)(3).
271. Abandonment occurs when the tenant surrenders possession of the premises to the
landlord and terminates payment of rent when due and payable. See 16 ARIZ. L. REV.
79, 127; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99. Abandonment does not occur merely
because the tenant vacates; the tenant must be shown to have intended to relinquish all
rights in the premises. See 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 129.
272. Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972).
273. E.g., Liberty Plan Co. v. Adwan, 370 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1962).
274. E.g., Baskin v. Thomas, 12 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370 (1882).
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99.
275. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99. For a discussion of mitigation of damages, see
text accompanying notes 403-09 infra.
276. Instead of requiring the landlord to sue the tenant for rent as it becomes due and payable
after the tenant abandons the premises, some states allow the landlord to treat the
abandonment and failure to pay rent as a repudiation of the lease and to sue the tenant
for total damages, as in the case of anticipatory breach of contract. Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Grayson v. Mixon, 176 Ark. 1123, 5
S.W.2d 312 (1928). Contra, Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928).
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99.
277. Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972); Ehlert v.
Woods, 57 Idaho 218, 63 P.2d 1000 (1937); Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 Utah 592, 200 P.
1025 (1921). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99.
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landlord who is aggrieved by a tenant's "termination of occupancy
before the end of the term" to mitigate damages.2 7 8 The courts are
likely to interpret this statute as referring to common law abandonment
because it encompasses the essence of that doctrine." 9 Under the
Maryland statute, the landlord's duty to mitigate damages does not
include an obligation "to show or lease the vacated dwelling unit in
preference to other available units," '28 since such action by the
landlord may be at the request of the prospective tenant of the
premises, and a contrary rule would allow the breaching tenant to
dictate to the landlord and prospective tenants the choice of which unit
to rent. Maryland also modifies the second common law option where
the tenant abandons the premises by allowing the landlord to "sublet
the dwelling unit without prior notice to the tenant in default" where a
tenant "wrongly fails or refuses to take possession of or vacates the
dwelling unit before the end of his term... .""' When the landlord
exercises his option to sublet the premises in Maryland, "[t]he tenant
in default is secondarily liable for rent for the term of his original
agreement in addition to his liability for consequential damages
resulting from his breach, if the landlord gives him prompt notice of
any default by the sublessee." '28 2
This latter requirement seems to be an exception to the landlord's
duty to mitigate damages when he exercises his option to sublet the
premises. The duty to mitigate damages presumably would require a
landlord to make reasonable efforts to relet the premises following
default by a "sublessee" after the landlord initially mitigated damages
by reletting the premises following default by the tenant. Under this
Maryland statute, however, after a sublessee defaults, a landlord would
not have to further mitigate damages if he promptly notifies the
defaulting tenant of the sublessee's default. In Maryland, the defaulting
tenant's only protection in this situation is to attempt to relet the
premises himself.
The URLTA, like Maryland, abolishes the first option under the
common law when the tenant has abandoned the premises by requiring
the landlord to make "reasonable efforts" to relet the premises "at a
fair rental value."2 3 "If the landlord rents the dwelling unit for a term
beginning before the expiration of the rental agreement, it terminates as
278. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-207(a)(3) (1974). A landlord's duty to mitigate
damages under this section cannot be waived. Id. § 8-207(d). In Baltimore City and in
Anne Arundel County, a landlord may not recover damages from a tenant who "fails to
take possession of or vacates the dwelling unit before the end of his term," in an amount
exceeding the "loss of rent caused by the termination of two months rent, whichever is
less, in addition to the cost of repairing damages to the premises which may have been
caused by an act or omission of the tenant." Id. § 8-212(a) (Supp. 1975).
279. See note 271 supra.
280. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-207(b) (1974).
281. Id. § 8-207(c).
282. Id.
283. URLTA § 4.203(c); see also URLTA § 1.105(a), which generally requires an aggrieved
party to mitigate damages.
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of the date of the new tenancy." '28 4 The term of a month-to-month or
week-to-week tenancy for this purpose is "deemed to be a month or a
week as the case may be."2 8 The rental agreement is deemed
terminated by the landlord as of the date he receives notice of the
abandonment, if he either fails to use reasonable efforts to relet the
premises or accepts the abandonment as a surrender.
2 8 6
The URLTA provides that rent is "uniformly apportionable from
day to day."2 7 Thus this rule makes the tenant liable for proportional
rent only for the period until the lease is terminated (regardless of the
term of the tenancy under the rental agreement).2 8
When the lease has terminated under Section 4.203(c) because the
premises were relet by the landlord, the landlord under Section
4.206289 can recover possession, apportionable rent, and a separate
claim for actual damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees if the
tenant's abandonment is willful. Section 4.206 of the URLTA also
implies that a landlord may recover actual damages when the lease has
terminated under Section 4.203, when the landlord has failed to use
reasonable efforts to rent the premises at a fair rental value, or when
the landlord has accepted the abandonment as a surrender. Under
common law, however, the landlord who accepted abandonment as a
surrender, or who, in exercising his second option, failed to make
reasonable efforts to relet at a fair rental value, was not entitled to
damages.2 9 ° In addition, to award the landlord damages after the
landlord has failed to reasonably mitigate damages when the tenant has
abandoned the premises would be contrary to the general duty of an
aggrieved party under Section 1.105(a) to mitigate damages. If Section
4.206 of the URLTA is interpreted as not modifying these common law
principles, it would not authorize damages to the landlord when the
landlord did not reasonably mitigate damages or when he accepted the
abandonment as a surrender. Under this interpretation of Section
4.206, when the tenant has abandoned the premises, the landlord can
recover apportionable rent up to the date of termination and, after the
284. Id. § 4.203(c).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. § 1.401(c).
288. This provision of the URLTA changes the common law rule that rent was not
apportionable. Diepenbrock v. Luiz, 159 Cal. 716, 115 P. 743 (1911). Under the
common law, when rent was not due until the end of the rental period, the landlord
could not recover rent in the event of early termination of the rental agreement by the
landlord. Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 Utah 592, 200 P. 1025 (1921). On the other hand, if
rent was payable at the beginning of the rental period, the tenant could not recover any
of the prepaid rent if the lease was terminated early. Wells v. Blystad, 91 Colo. 346, 14
P.2d 1078 (1932). See 16 ARiz. L. REV. 79, 90.
289. This section provides that
[i]f the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord has a claim for possession
and for rent and a separate claim for actual damages for breach of the rental
agreement and reasonable attorney's fees as provided in Section 4.201(c).
290. See note 275 supra.
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lease has terminated, actual damages (if the landlord's conduct resulting
in termination of the lease is not held to bar his recovery of damages).
Actual damages presumably would be measured by the difference
between the amount of rent due under the rental agreement and the
rent, if any, that the landlord obtained after making "reasonable efforts
to rent ... at a fair rental," for the remainder of the tenant's term.
Because of this uncertainty in the interpretation of the URLTA, the
pIresent Maryland statute is preferable. The Maryland statute, however,
should be amended to follow the URLTA with respect to a landlord's
general duty to mitigate damages when the tenant has abandoned and
with respect to apportionment of rent when the lease is terminated
after abandonment.
In addition to governing situations where the tenant abandons the
premises prior to the termination of the tenancy, the URLTA also
governs prolonged absences from the premises by the tenant. This
situation was not governed by the common law or by Maryland statute.
The URLTA provides that a tenant may be required by the rental
agreement to notify the landlord if he anticipates that he will be absent
from the premises for more than 7 days.2 9' This notice must be given
no later than the first day of the extended absence.2 92 If the tenant
"willfully" fails to give such notice when required to do so by the
rental agreement, the landlord may recover actual damages from the
tenant.2 93 When the tenant is absent from the premises for more than 7
days, the landlord may enter the premises "at times reasonably
necessary," '2 94 presumably to protect the tenant's property or to
protect against damage by vandals. This amendment of the common
law is desirable, because it protects the tenant's personal property and
protects the landlord's investment in the premises from being damaged
by vandalism during the tenant's prolonged absence.
G. Tenant's Duty to Obey the Rental Agreement and Rules and
Regulations
A landlord and tenant, under the common law, were able to include
in the rental agreement any rules or regulations that they considered
acceptable.2 9 Rules and regulations adopted by the landlord after the
rental agreement was executed could be enforced against a tenant if
they were reasonable. 96
There are no statutes in Maryland governing rules and regulations
promulgated by landlords. Many leases in Maryland include a provision
whereby the tenant agrees to obey rules and regulations issued by the
291. URLTA § 3.104.
292. Id.
293. Id. § 4 .203(a). The landlord may be damaged in such situations if the premises are
vandalized in the tenant's absence.
294. Id. § 4.203(b).
295. 16 ARiz. L. REV. 79, 124.
296. Id.
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landlord subsequent to the signing of the lease; violation of such rules
then becomes a violation of the lease and therefore possible grounds for
eviction. 9
Section 3.102 of the URLTA restricts the rules and regulations that
the landlord can enforce against his tenants. Section 3.102 limits the
enforcement against a tenant of rules and regulations applicable at the
time of execution of the lease as well as rules and regulations adopted
after the execution. A rule or regulation adopted after the tenant enters
into the rental agreement that "works a substantial modification of his
bargain... is not valid unless the tenant agrees to it in writ-
ing." '2 9 Rules and regulations, whether adopted before or after the
tenant's execution of the lease, are not enforceable against the tenant
unless he has notice of the rule or regulation at the time of
adoption, 29 9 and they are reasonably related to the purpose of
promoting the tenant's convenience, safety or welfare, preventing abuse
of the premises, or fairly distributing services and facilities among the
tenants.30 0 In addition, rules and regulations, in order to be enforce-
able, must be fairly applied to all tenants, and must be sufficiently
explicit as to the duties imposed. 0 ' The limitations imposed by
URLTA upon rules and regulations that may be enforced by a landlord
would be a desirable protection for tenants in Maryland.
Both the URLTA 30 2 and the Maryland statute30 3 prohibit leases
from containing certain oppressive provisions. The Maryland statute, as
does the URLTA, prohibits and makes unenforceable lease provisions
which authorize confession of judgments0 4 or waiver of the tenant's
297. See text accompanying note 340 infra.
298. URLTA § 3.102(b).
299. Id. § 3.102(a)(6).
300. Id. § 3.102(a)(1).
301. Id. §§ 3.102(a)(3), (4). Enactment of a statute similar to the New Jersey good cause
eviction statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A § 18:53 (Supp. 1975), would supplement Section
3.102 of the URLTA, since it would limit the grounds for eviction during the term of the
lease, as well as the grounds for non-renewal of a lease by a landlord, thus drastically
altering the estates in land concept of the landlord's reversion at the end of the term of
the lease. See Note, New Rights for New Jersey Tenants-"Good Cause" Eviction and
"Reasonable" Rents, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 565 (1975).
302. URLTA § 1.403.
303. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Property Art., § 8-208 (Supp. 1975). Id. § 8-203.1 (Supp. 1975),
provides that -no landlord "who offers more than 4 dwelling units for rent on one parcel
of property or at one location and who rents by means of written leases" may include a
provision in a lease authorizing the landlord to take possession of the premises or the
tenant's personal property except pursuant to law, Id. § 8-203.1(b)(1); or a provision
authorizing the landlord to attempt to evict the tenant solely because he is planning,
organizing or joining a tenants' organization to collectively negotiate with the landlord.
Id. § 8-203.1(b)(2). This section should be repealed because it duplicates Section 8-208
of the Maryland Annotated Code, Real Property Article, but is narrower in scope
because it applies only to certain residential landlords. Id. § 8-501 (Supp. 1975),
prohibits a written agreement between a landlord and tenant from providing "for a
longer notice period to be furnished by the tenant to the landlord in order to terminate
the tenancy than that required of the landlord to the tenant in order to terminate the
tenancy."
304. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).
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rights or remedies under law.3"' Under the URLTA, a lease provision
may not exculpate or limit the liability of the landlord arising under
law;3" 6 provide that the tenant agree to confession of judgment on a
claim arising under the rental agreement; 30 7 or provide that the tenant
agree to waive or forego rights or remedies arising under the
URLTA.3 °5 The Maryland statute, unlike the URLTA, forbids provi-
sions which provide for excessive penalties for late payment of
rent,30 9 or which provide for a shorter period of notice to quit by the
landlord than is authorized by law.31 0 It also forbids provisions which
authorize the landlord to take possession of the premises or the tenant's
personal property except when the lease has been terminated by action
of the parties or by operation of law and the tenant has abandoned
such personal property without "the benefit of formal legal proc-
ess." 31 ' The URLTA, unlike Maryland, prohibits lease provisions
whereby a tenant agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; 31 2 or
agrees to indemnify the landlord for his liability arising under law, or
for connected costs. 31 3 Under the URLTA, rules and regulations would
also be subject to the prohibition against unconscionable provisions in
rental agreements. 3 4 Rules and regulations would probably be held to
305. Id. § 8-208(a)(2) (Supp. 1975). There is also a specific prohibition against a lease
provision whereby the tenant agrees to waive his right to a jury trial. Id. § 8-208(a)(4)
(Supp. 1975). This prohibition, however, would probably be inferred from the
prohibition against a provision whereby the tenant agrees to waive any right provided by
applicable law.
306. URLTA § 1.403(a)(4).
307. Id. § 1.403(a)(2).
308. Id. § 1.403(a)(1).
309. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
310. Id. § 8-208(a)(5). )
311. Id. § 8-208(a)(6). The Maryland statute also makes automatic lease renewal provisions
(subject to termination if the tenant gives prior notice) unenforceable unless such
provision is distinctly set forth in the lease and is separately acknowledged by the tenant.
Id. § 8-208(b)(1).
312. URLTA § 1.403(a)(3). This provision of the URLTA has been criticized because there
are instances under the URLTA in which the tenant may be required to pay the
landlord's attorney's fees if there is a willful noncompliance with the rental agreement by
the tenant, Id. § 4.201(c), or if the tenant refuses to allow lawful access to the premises
by the landlord. Id. § 4.302(a). Section 1.403 of the URLTA, if read literally, would
impose a penalty on a landlord who includes a provision in the lease providing that the
tenant agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees under circumstances authorized by
these sections of the URLTA. This inconsistency should be eliminated by amendment of
Section 1.403. See Subcommittee on Leases, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act: Some Suggestions for Improvement, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 402, 403
(1974).
313. URLTA § 1.403(a)(4).
314. Id. § 1.303. This section has been criticized on the grounds that the term "unconscion-
able" is too amorphous to be workable. In the Comment to Section 1.303 of the
URLTA, the drafters of the Act attempt to answer this criticism and lay down guidelines
for interpretation of the term. "The basic test is whether, in light of the background and
setting of the market, the conditions of the particular parties to the rental agreement,
settlement or waiver of right to claim are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the agreement or settlement. Thus,
the particular facts involved in each case are of utmost importance since unconscion-
be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable,3"' if they were
oppressive or were not reasonably related to the tenant's "use and
occupancy of the premises., 3 6 This prohibition against unconscion-
able provisions, however, does not authorize the tenant to recover
damages against the landlord.
Under both the Maryland statute and the URLTA, any prohibited
lease provision is unenforceable by the landlord. In Maryland, if a
landlord tenders a lease containing one of these prohibited lease
provisions, or a provision made unenforceable by two other Maryland
statutes,31 7 or attempts or threatens to enforce such provisions, the
tenant may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
31  If
the landlord "deliberately" uses a lease containing provisions "known by
him to be prohibited," the URLTA authorizes the tenant to recover his
actual damages as well as punitive damages of up to three months' rent
and reasonable attorney's fees. 31 9 There is no provision under the
Maryland statute, as there is under the URLTA, for an award of
punitive damages. Authorization of punitive damages may be desirable
in order to deter landlords from placing prohibited provisions in leases.
From the viewpoint of the tenant, the URLTA's prohibited lease
provision section, if amended to prohibit the same provisions now
prohibited by the Maryland statute, would be preferable because it
includes a prohibition against "unconscionable" provisions, and also
authorizes punitive damages to be awarded.
Under the common law, which is followed in Maryland, courts will
not terminate a lease because of a tenant's breach of a provision, rule or
regulation of a lease, unless the tenant's breach is willful and substantial
(i.e., material) and the tenant fails to cure his breach within a
reasonable period of time after receiving notice of his breach from the
landlord.3 2 ° In addition to or instead of terminating the lease, the
landlord under the common law may also recover damages from the
tenant who has breached a covenant in the lease; the amount of
damages is determined pursuant to principles of contract law.3 21
The URLTA essentially follows the common law regarding the
landlord's termination of a lease where the tenant has breached a
provision, rule or regulation of the rental agreement. Section 4.201 of
ability may exist in some situations but not in others." The Uniform Commercial Code,
which applies to the sale of goods, has a similar section, which has been adopted in
Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-302 (1975).
315. URLTA § 1.303(a)(1).
316. Id. § 3.102(a).
317. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-105 (1974) (Provisions exculpating landlord's tort
liability to persons injured in common areas). See text accompanying notes 141-42
supra; § 8-203 (security deposits) and text accompanying notes 161-98 supra.
318. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208(c)(2) (Supp. 1975).
319. URLTA § 1.403(b). "A person 'knows' or 'has knowledge' of a fact if he has actual
knowledge of it." Id. § 1.304(a)(3).
320. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Dworman Bldg. Corp., 264 Md. 50, 284 A.2d 400 (1971); Wylie
v. Kirby, 115 Md. 282, 80 A. 962 (1911).
321. See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 183 (1970).
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the URLTA authorizes the landlord to terminate a rental agreement
when the tenant has materially breached a provision of the rental
agreement or a valid rule or regulation. Prior to termination of the
lease, the landlord must first give the tenant written notice specifying
the breach and stating that the rental agreement will terminate at a date
not less than 30 days after receipt of the notice. 2 2 If the tenant does
not cure his breach within 14 days of receipt of the notice, the lease
terminates as specified by the notice.32 3 The URLTA should be
amended to require the notice to specify the tenant's right to cure his
breach. If the tenant breaches a provision, rule or regulation of the
rental agreement in substantially the same manner within 6 months, the
landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least 14 days'
written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the
rental agreement. 2 4
In addition to terminating the lease, the landlord may recover actual
damages.3 2 If the landlord cannot terminate the lease because the
tenant's breach of a provision, rule or regulation of the lease is
non-material, the landlord may still recover actual damages and obtain
injunctive relief. 2 6
Under the URLTA, the landlord waives his right to terminate a lease
for a breach if he accepts performance "that varies from the terms of
the rental agreement. . .," unless the parties agree otherwise after the
tenant's breach has occurred.32  The Official Comment to Sec-
tion 4.204 states that if a breach of a continuing duty is involved,
acceptance of performance will not bar the landlord's remedy for a
later breach. Section 4.204 does not state if the landlord also waives his
right to recover damages by waiving his right to terminate the lease. A
specific provision with respect to this problem would be desirable.
The URLTA thus gives the landlord a choice of remedies similar to
those under the common law when the tenant has breached a provision
of a lease or a rule or regulation.
H. Holdover Tenants
When the tenant remains in possession after the lease or tenancy has
terminated or expired,32 he is considered by the common law to be a
322. URLTA § 4.201(a).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. § 4.201(c).
326. Id. Where the tenant's breach of a provision, rule or regulation of the rental agreement is
willful, a landlord may recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to actual damages.
Id.
327. Id. § 4.204.
328. Whether a tenant remains "in possession" after termination of the tenancy is a question
of fact. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.34. Courts have held that leaving a few
articles of worthless property on the premises, or retaining the keys to the premises, does
not constitute remaining in possession in this context. Id. Possession of the premises for
a fraction of the day after termination or expiration of the lease or tenancy has been
held not to constitute holding over beyond termination. Id.
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tenant at sufferance or a holdover tenant.32 9 Under the common law,
the landlord may elect either to bring an action to eject the tenant and
recover damages or consent to continued possession by the holdover
tenant.330 This election of remedies is available to the landlord even
though he previously terminated the tenancy. 33 1 The tenant, after
holding over, is subject to the remedy elected by the landlord even
though he stated that he does not intend to become a tenant pursuant
to this doctrine. 332 The courts conflict over whether the landlord must
make a prompt election of remedies; some courts interpret the failure
of a landlord to elect his remedy within a reasonable period of time as
his consent to the holdover tenant to remain in possession as a
329. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.32. In fact, a tenant at sufferance or a holding over
tenant is not a tenant, since he is not in possession pursuant to an oral or written lease or
otherwise with the consent of the landlord. The only difference between a tenant at
sufferance and a trespasser is that the holdover tenant, although wrongfully in
possession, entered the premises lawfully. Id.
330. Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A.2d 165 (1958); Smith v.
Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935); A. H. Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160
Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930).
In addition, under the English rule, which has been followed in Maryland, the
landlord can recover possession by self-help use of reasonable and necessary force,
without resort to legal process or remedies, to expel the tenant who wrongfully remains
in possession after termination of the lease or tenancy. Manning v. Brown, 47 Md. 506
(1878); see Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966). Under this rule, the landlord who uses force
which is not reasonable and necessary may be liable to the tenant for damages. See
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966). This rule may have been affected, however, by MD.
ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208(a)(6) (Supp. 1975), which prohibits a residential
lease from containing a
provision authorizing the landlord to take possession of the leased premises, or the
tenant's personal property therein unless the lease has been terminated by action
of the parties or by operation of law, and such personal property has been
abandoned by the tenant without the benefit of formal legal process.
This section might be interpreted as prohibiting a lease provision authorizing the landlord
to use self-help to expel a wrongfully holding over tenant; however, it does not prohibit
the landlord from regaining possession by self-help in the absence of such a lease
provision. The modern rule, followed by an increasing number of courts, is that the
landlord must resort to legal process and remedies to recover possession when the lease
or tenancy has terminated. See Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361
P.2d 20 (1961); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966). Under this modern rule, the wrongfully
holding over tenant may recover damages and restitution of possession of the premises
where the landlord has used self-help force or deception to regain possession, even
though the tenant has wrongfully held over after termination of the tenancy and has no
right to possession. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 at 199. The position of the URLTA
with respect of self-help repossession by the landlord is unclear. Section 4.207 of the
URLTA provides that "a landlord may not recover or take possession of the dwelling
unit by action or otherwise ... except in case of abandonment, surrender, or as
permitted in this Act." This reference to taking possession "otherwise" than by action
might be interpreted as indicating approval of self-help repossession. On the other hand,
the limitation upon recovery of possession "except in case of abandonment, surrender,
or as permitted in this Act" could be construed as only permitting recovery of possession
by legal action pursuant to specific provisions of the URLTA, except in cases of
abandonment or surrender (in which cases self-help repossession would be permitted
under the URLTA).
331. Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A.2d 165 (1958); A. H.
Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930). See 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 3.33.
332. Id.
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tenant.33 3 The landlord's consent can occur by formal language or by
acts inferred from his conduct, such as his acceptance of rent from the
holdover tenant.3 34 The landlord's election of a remedy is irrevoca-
ble.
335
If the landlord elects to accept the holdover tenant as a tenant, the
new tenancy is subject to the general terms and conditions of the prior
tenancy336
Maryland, following the majority rule, holds that the tenancy created
by the lessor's election to consent to possession by the holdover tenant
is a periodic tenancy. 3 7 The Maryland Court of Appeals states that the
period of such tenancy is determined by the period for which rent is
reserved under the lease,338 while some other courts hold that the
period of the tenancy is determined by the term of the original
lease.339
The URLTA would change Maryland law by providing that when the
landlord consents to continued occupancy by the holdover tenant, the
tenancy is a month-to-month tenancy.3 40
Under the common law, the landlord may sue to recover possession
and damages from the holdover tenant, including the fair rental value of
the premises during the holding over and any special damages which are
reasonably foreseeable as a result of holding over.34 ' The tenant's
holding over may cause the landlord to breach his covenant to deliver
possession 342 to a new tenant, making him liable to the new tenant for
damages caused by the landlord's breach of his covenant. Special
333. Id. Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD. L. REv. 1, 6 (1960);
Note, 19 MD. L. REV. 151, 153 (1959).
334. See Note, 19 Mn. L. REV. 151, 153 (1959); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.33.
335. Note, 19 MD. L. REV. 151, 154 (1959).
336. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.35; see Darling Shops Delaware Corp. v. Baltimore
Center Corp., 191 Md. 289, 60 A.2d 669 (1948). There is a split of authority as to
whether the landlord over the protest of the tenant, may change the terms and
conditions of tenancy created after a holdover. See Annot., 109 A.L.R. 197 (1937).
337. A. H. Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930); See Darling
Shops Delaware Corp. v. Baltimore Center Corp., 191 Md. 289, 60 A.2d 669 (1948).
338. A. H. Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930). Thus, if the
lease reserves an annual rental, the new tenancy after the holdover is a year-to-year
tenancy, even though the annual rent is payable in monthly installments and even though
the term of the lease was for a fixed period greater than one year. Id. Courts that follow
the majority rule require the landlord or tenant to give notice to terminate such tenancy.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.35. See the section on Termination of Periodic
Tenancy at text accompanying notes 384-405 infra.
339. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.35. Courts that follow this rule make the tenancy
a year-to-year tenancy when the term under the lease was for more than a year. Annot.,
108 A.L.R. 1464 (1937). A minority of courts hold that the new tenancy created after
the holdover tenancy is a tenancy for a definite term which ends without notice. 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.35.
340. URLTA § 4.301(c).
341. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.36. A tenant who is entitled to possession has an
action under Maryland statute and common law and under the URLTA against a
landlord who fails to deliver possession because of a holdover tenant. See section on
Landlord's Duty to Deliver Possession at text accompanying notes 127-38 supra.
342. See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
damages might include the cost to the landlord of providing substitute
housing for the new tenant who is unable to take possession because of
the holdover tenant, storage of furniture and other goods, and the cost
of moving stored items to the premises when the landlord can deliver
possession of the premises. Both Maryland3 43 and the URLTA 344 au-
thorize the landlord to bring an ejectment action against the wrongfully
holding over tenant even though the landlord has entered into a lease
with a new tenant.
Maryland provides the landlord with a summary proceeding to
recover possession of the premises from a holdover tenant. 45 In order
to recover possession in this summary proceeding, the landlord must
first give the tenant written notice to quit prior to the expiration of the
term or termination of the period.3 4 6 If the tenant fails to remove from
the premises after receiving timely notice, the landlord may recover
possession in a summary proceeding. 34 7 The landlord in Maryland is
also entitled to recover actual damages in this summary proceeding, but
he may not recover damages exceeding "double the rent under the
lease, apportioned for the duration of the holdover. ' 348 In order to
recover damages in the summary ejectment action for possession, the
landlord must first give the tenant written notice stating the tenant's
potential liability for damages.3 49 "Damages in excess of the rental rate
specified in the lease . . . accrue only from the end of the term or thirty
(30) days after the delivery" of notice to the tenant informing him of
his potential liability for damages, whichever is later.35 ° When damages
in excess of the rental rate specified in the lease have not accrued, the
landlord is entitled to damages in an amount not less than the
"apportioned rent for the period of the holdover at the rent rate under
the lease.",35 ' The provisions regarding recovery of damages in a
summary ejectment proceeding by the landlord are not "intended to
limit any other remedies which a landlord may have against a holdover
tenant under the lease or under applicable law. '3 2 The Maryland
summary ejectment statute consequently does not preclude a separate
343. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-204(f) (1974). "The landlord may join the new
tenant as a party to the action." Id.
344. URLTA § 2.103, Comment.
345. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-402(b) (Supp. 1975), amending § 8-402(b)
(1974).
346. Id. The amount of time by which the notice must precede the expiration of the term or
the period depends upon whether the tenant is a tenant under a lease for a definite term,
a periodic tenant, or a tenant at will; the length of required notice is discussed in the
section on Termination of Periodic Tenancy at text accompanying notes 384-402 infra.
347. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-402(b) (Supp. 1975), amending § 8-402(b)
(1974).
348. Id. § 8-402(a)(2)(i) (1974).
349. Id. § 8-4 02(a)(3) (1974). This notice may be given at any time before or after
termination of the lease, but not more than 100 days before termination of the lease. Id.
This notice may not be waived by lease provisions or otherwise. Id.
350. Id. § 8-402(a)(2)(iv) (1974).
351. Id.
352. Id. § 8-4 02(a)(4).
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common law action by the landlord to recover all actual damages from
the holdover tenant. Under the Maryland summary ejectment statute,
notice to the tenant of his potential liability for damages in a summary
ejectment proceeding is not to "be construed as an election of remedies
by the landlord if the notice is given prior to the end of the lease
term." 3 3 The inference is that the landlord may be precluded from
bringing a separate action for damages if he delays giving the notice of
potential liability until after the end of the lease term; in such a case he
may be entitled to recover damages only in the summary ejectment
action.
The URLTA differs in a number of respects from Maryland's
summary ejectment statute. Although the URLTA provides the
landlord with an action to recover possession and damages from the
holdover tenant,3" 4 this action is not specified to be a summary
proceeding, as it is in Maryland; it appears to be nothing more than a
common law ejectment action for possession and damages.3"'
The URLTA, unlike the Maryland summary ejectment statute, does
not require that the landlord give notice to quit to the tenant before he
can bring an action for possession and damages. The URLTA allows the
landlord to recover damages from the holdover tenant only when "the
tenant's holdover is willful and not in good faith,' '3s 6 while the
Maryland summary ejectment statute authorizes recovery of damages
from the tenant who "unlawfully" holds over.35 ' Despite this dif-
ference in language with respect to which holdover tenants are liable for
damages, both probably would be interpreted to be consistent with the
common law so as to exempt the holdover tenant from liability for
damages when the holding over is due to circumstances beyond the
control of the tenant, such as illness of the tenant or a member of his
family, 35 8 or a strike that prevents the tenant from moving his
belongings.3"9 On the other hand, the URLTA, unlike the Maryland
summary ejectment statute, does not limit the amount of damages that
the landlord may recover from the holdover tenant to an amount less
than actual damages. 360 The URLTA, unlike Maryland, contains no
353. Id.
354. URLTA § 4.301(c).
355. The Comment to URLTA § 2.103 states that the landlord's or tenant's action against
the holdover tenant may be in a summary proceeding when "appropriate;" the URLTA
apparently envisions that enacting states will specify whether an action under Section
4.301 is to be a summary proceeding.
356. URLTA § 4.301(c).
357. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8402(a) (1974).
358. E.g., Herter v. Mullen, 159 N.Y. 28, 53 N.E. 700 (1899).
359. Feiges v. Racine Dry Goods Co., 231 Wis. 270, 285 N.W. 799 (1939). If the tenant
remains in possession after termination of the lease as a result of negotiations for a new
lease with the landlord, a tenancy at will, not a periodic tenancy, is created. Donnelly
Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A.2d 165 (1958). See 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.34.
360. Where the tenant's holdover is willful and not in good faith, the URLTA authorizes the
landlord to recover actual damages, but not to exceed "more than 3 month's periodic
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provisions regarding accrual of damages in excess of the specified rental
rate or regarding the minimum amount of damages. The URLTA,
unlike the Maryland summary ejectment statute, does not specifically
authorize recovery of damages from the holdover tenant in an action
separate from the action for possession.
The URLTA is more fair to landlords than the Maryland summary
ejectment statute, because it allows the landlord to recover all actual
damages, as well as punitive damages and reasonable attorney's
fees. 36' The URLTA, however, does not provide a summary proceeding
as does the Maryland summary ejectment statute.
VI. RETALIATORY CONDUCT
Under the common law, the landlord may evict or eject the tenant
during the term of the lease only when the tenant has breached a
material covenant or clause of the lease,3 62 a condition in the
lease,3 63 or a right of re-entry or power of termination in the
lease.3 64 The landlord, under the common law concept of estates in
land, however, has a reversion at the end of the leasehold estate. 36' The
landlord, under the common law, can fail to renew a written lease, or
terminate a periodic tenancy, for any reason at all or for no
reason. 366 The tenant who holds over after the termination of the lease
or tenancy can be ejected by the landlord.3 67
With the recent growth of activities by tenants to enforce and
expand their rights against landlords, tenants have become concerned
that landlords might retaliate against them for joining or organizing a
tenants' organization, or for filing complaints with the landlord or with
public officials, by evicting or ejecting them during the term of the
lease, by not renewing a written lease after the term has expired, by
terminating a periodic tenancy, by increasing rent, or by decreasing
rent or threefold the actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's
fees." URLTA § 4.301(c). The URLTA thus implicitly authorizes a court to award both
actual damages and punitive damages against a holdover tenant. Maryland, although
authorizing the landlord to recover costs as part of a judgment against the holdover
tenant, MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-402(b)(2) (1974), does not authorize the
landlord to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the holdover tenant.
361. Because both the Maryland summary ejectment statute and the URLTA would not
authorize recovery of damages against the holdover tenant unless the holding over was
willful and not in good faith, see text accompanying note 357 supra, limitation of
damages that may be recovered by the landlord to an amount below actual damages is
unfair.
362. See text accompanying note 320 supra.
363. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.94.
364. Id.
365. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.2.
366. E.g., Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 234, 85 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1949); Wormwood v.
Alton Bay Camp Meeting Ass'n, 87 N.H. 136, 175 A. 233 (1934).
367. See text accompanying notes 328-61 supra; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.32-.36.
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services. In response to this concern, courts36 8 and legislatures 36 9 have
increasingly prohibited such retaliatory conduct by landlords.
The Maryland statute370 prohibits eviction of the tenant, an increase
in the tenant's rent, or a decrease in the tenant's services, solely for the
reason that the tenant has filed a written complaint with the landlord
or with any public agency 37 ' or that "the tenant is a member or
organizer of any tenants' organization.
37 2
The URLTA similarly prohibits the landlord from increasing rent,
decreasing services, or "bringing or threatening to bring an action for
possession" after the tenant "has complained to a governmental agency
charged with responsibility for enforcement of a building or housing
code of a violation applicable to the premises materially affecting
health and safety;" has complained to the landlord of a violation of the
landlord's duty to maintain the premises; or "has organized or become
a member of a tenants' union or similar organization. 3 73 The
Maryland statute, unlike the URLTA, does not specify to which
governmental or public agency the tenant's complaint must be directed;
under the Maryland statute, the tenant would presumably be protected
against retaliation for filing, without good faith, a frivolous complaint,
or for filing, without good faith, a complaint with an administrative
agency which does not have jurisdiction to take enforcement action
against the landlord. On the other hand, the Maryland statute applies
only where the tenant's complaint to a governmental agency or
landlord is made in writing,374 while the URLTA applies when the
tenant "makes a complaint" to a governmental agency or land-
lord. 37' The URLTA, unlike the Maryland statute, would apply when
the tenant has made a complaint by telephone or in person. The
Maryland statute also prohibits retaliation by the landlord against the
tenant solely because the tenant "has filed a law suit, or law suits,
against the landlord; ' 376 the tenant presumably would be protected
when the law suit is frivolous and not filed in good faith.
368. E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 281, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971); Silberg v.
Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (1971); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 309,
173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
369. E.g., MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A
§ 42-10.10 (Supp. 1975-76).
370. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1975). Id. § 8-203.1(b)(2) (Supp.
1975), prohibits the landlord, "who offers more than 4 dwelling units for rent on one
parcel of property or at one location and who rents by means of written leases," from
placing a clause in the lease authorizing the landlord "to commence an eviction
proceeding or issue a notice to quit solely and exclusively, without any other basis, as
retaliation against any tenant for planning, organizing, or joining a tenant organization
with the purpose of negotiating collectively with the landlord." MD. ANN. CODE, Real
Prop. Art., § 8-206 (1974), regulates retaliatory evictions in Montgomery County.
371. Id. § 8-208.1(a)(2)(1) (Supp. 1975).
372. Id. § 8-208.1(a)(2)(3) (Supp. 1975).
373. URLTA § 5.101.
374. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1(a)(2)(1) (Supp. 1975).
375. URLTA §§ 5.101(a)(1), (2).
376. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1(a)(2)(2) (Supp. 1975).
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The tenant raising retaliatory action as a defense would find other
significant differences between the URLTA and the Maryland statute.
Maryland allows the defense if the landlord acted "solely" in retaliation
against the tenant. 3 " The burden implicitly is on the tenant to show
that retaliation is the sole reason for the action and if the landlord can
show any additional grounds for his action, the defense of retaliatory
action presumably would not be recognized. The URLTA does not use
the word "solely" with respect to the landlord's reasons for certain
conduct; it simply prohibits certain types of action for specified
retaliatory purposes. Consequently, even if the landlord has reasons for
his action in addition to a proscribed retaliatory reason, the URLTA
might be interpreted to recognize the defense of retaliatory eviction.
The Maryland statute provides that actions by the landlord after six
months from a determination of court or agency proceedings initiated
by the tenant's complaint are not retaliatory actions.3 78 The URLTA,
on the other hand, provides that evidence that the tenant filed a
complaint within one year prior to an alleged action of retaliation by
the landlord raises a rebuttable presumption that the landlord's conduct
was retaliatory.3 79
Neither the URLTA nor the Maryland statute, however, appear to be
applicable to retaliatory non-renewal of a lease by the landlord. The
Maryland statute refers only to retaliatory "eviction" of the
tenant,3 8 ° which might not be interpreted to be applicable to non-
renewal of a lease by the landlord for retaliatory reasons. The URLTA
also might not be interpreted to apply to the landlord's non-renewal of
the lease, since it refers only to "bringing or threatening to bring an
action for possession. ,,381 This is a substantial weakness, because
under the common law the landlord may fail to renew a lease for any
reason or no reason, but may not evict the tenant holding over pursuant
to a written lease except for a material breach of a condition or
covenant of the lease.
Pursuant to Section 5.101(c) of the URLTA, the tenant does not
have the defense of retaliatory eviction to the landlord's action for
possession if the violation of the housing code which generated the
complaint was primarily caused by a "lack of reasonable care by the
tenant," members of the tenant's household, or a "person on the
premises with his consent." No such provision is contained in the
Maryland statute. In addition, under the URLTA, the defense of
retaliatory eviction is not applicable to the landlord's action for
possession if "the tenant is in default in rent" or the violations of the
housing or building code require "alteration, remodeling or demolition
377. Id. § 8-208.1(a)(2).
378. Id. § 8-208.1(e).
379. URLTA § 5.101(b). "The presumption does not arise if the tenant made the complaint
after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution of services." Id.
380. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 8-208.1(a)(2), (b), (c), (e) (Supp. 1975).
381. URLTA § 5.101(a).
of the premises which would effectively deprive the tenant of use of the
dwelling unit., 382 The Maryland statute has no such exceptions to its
coverage. Section 8-208.1(d) of the Maryland statute, however, makes
the defense unavailable to tenants who have received a specified
number of summonses for unpaid rent in the previous 12 months. The
URLTA has no such exceptions to its coverage.
The Maryland statute authorizes a court to award reasonable
attorney's fees and costs to a tenant who successfully raises a
retaliatory action defense.3 3 This award is within the discretion of the
court. Section 4.107 of the URLTA provides for mandatory award to a
successful tenant of up to three months' periodic rent or threefold
actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's fees.
The URLTA is preferable to the Maryland retaliatory eviction
statute, because it applies when the tenant has made a complaint by
telephone or in person, and makes the passage of time since the tenant's
complaint only a rebuttable presumption, rather than a defense as in
Maryland. In addition, the URLTA, unlike the Maryland statute, does
not protect the tenant who, without good faith, makes a frivolous
complaint to the landlord or governmental agency or makes a
complaint to a governmental agency without jurisdiction over his
complaint. The URLTA should be amended, however, to protect
against retaliation when the tenant files a lawsuit against the landlord,
and to protect against retaliatory non-renewal of a lease or retaliatory
termination of a periodic tenancy.
VII. TERMINATION OF PERIODIC TENANCY
Where a tenancy is for a definite period of time, the common law
does not require the landlord to give the tenant notice to quit at the
end of the term, because the tenancy is considered to terminate by
lapse of the specified period of time.38 4 In order to use the summary
ejectment procedures in Maryland to eject the tenant who holds over
after the termination of a lease for a definite term, however, the
landlord must give the tenant written notice to quit at least one month
before the expiration of the term.3 8 The URLTA does not require the
382. Id. § 5.101(c).
383. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1(c) (Supp. 1975). In addition to providing a
defense to an action for possession by the landlord, the possibility exists that the
landlord's retaliatory conduct may provide the basis for a counterclaim against the
landlord for damages suffered by the tenant as a result of retaliatory rent increase,
decrease of services, or eviction. The Maryland statute, however, is silent with respect to
such counterclaims.
384. Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329 (1946). For a discussion of termination of a
lease by the landlord for breach by the tenant of a rule, regulation, or covenant of a
lease, see section on Tenant's Duty to Obey Rental Agreement and Rules and
Regulations, at text accompanying notes 320-27 supra.
385. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-402(b) (Supp. 1975), amending Real Prop. Art.,
§ 8-402(b) (1974).
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landlord to give a notice to quit at the end of term to the tenant under
a fixed term lease before the landlord may bring a suit to eject the
tenant if he holds over;3 6 the procedure under the URLTA, however,
is not a summary procedure as in Maryland.
Early in the development of the common law, the courts held that if
no period for the tenancy was specified in a rental agreement, a tenancy
at will was created.3 87 A tenancy at will could be terminated by the
landlord without prior notice to the tenant.35 8 Common law courts
later held that a tenancy without a fixed term is a periodic tenancy
rather than a tenancy at- will; 38 9 a periodic tenancy cannot be
terminated by either landlord or tenant without prior notice to the
other party. 39" The length of a periodic tenancy is determined by the
period for which rent is due and payable. 9 A periodic tenancy may be
created by express agreement or by implication, as where the tenant
enters into possession and pays rent periodically, without an agreement
or understanding as to the term of the tenancy.3 9 2
Maryland specifies by statute the notice which must be given by the
landlord 39 3 in order to terminate a periodic tenancy. If the periodic
tenancy is from year-to-year, the landlord must give notice at least
three months before the expiration of the current year of the
tenancy. 394 In order to terminate a periodic month-to-month tenancy,
the landlord must give notice at least one month before expiration of
the period. 39' The landlord, however, must give only a week's notice to
a tenant in order to terminate a periodic week-to-week tenancy.3 96 If
the tenant gives notice to the landlord of intent to terminate a tenancy,
at least one month before the expiration of any lease or tenancy except
a year-to-year tenancy (in which case three months' notice must be
386. URLTA § 4.301(c).
387. See Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A.2d 165 (1958). See
also Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD. L. REV. 1, 5 (1960).
388. See Darling Shops Delaware Corp. v. Baltimore Center Corp., 191 Md. 289, 60 A.2d
669 (1948).
389. Id.
390. Id. Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876). A tenancy at will and a periodic tenancy could be
terminated for any reason or' no reason under the common law. See section on
Retaliatory Conduct, at text accompanying notes 362-83 supra.
391. A periodic tenancy may be from year-to-year, month-to-month, week-to-week, or for
some other period.
392. See Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A.2d 165 (1958). See
also Rhynhart, supra note 387, at 5. A periodic tenancy may also be created when the
tenant remains in possession with the consent of the landlord after the expiration of a
lease for a definite term or after termination of a periodic tenancy. See section on
Holdover Tenants at text accompanying notes 328-61 supra.
393. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 8-402(b)(1)(1974), 8-402(b)(4) (Supp. 1975). A
landlord must give notice in writing. Id.
394. Id. § 8-402(b)(4) (Supp. 1975).
395. Id. § 8-402(b)(4). The Maryland statute also requires a month's notice by the landlord
to terminate a tenancy at will. Id. § 8-402(b)(1) (1974). The effect of this provision is to
eliminate the common law rule that the tenant at will could be evicted or ejected
without notice.
396. Id. § 8-402(b)(4) (Supp. 1975).
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given), the landlord does not have to give the tenant written notice to
quit.39 7 If the landlord fails to give the required notice by the time
specified, the periodic tenancy presumably would not terminate until
the end of the next periodic term?98
The URLTA would eliminate year-to-year periodic tenancies in
Maryland. Under the URLTA, unless the rental agreement fixes a
definite term, the tenancy is a week-to-week tenancy in the case of a
roomer who pays weekly rent, but in all other cases the tenancy is a
month-to-month tenancy.3 99 This rule applies even when the holdover
tenant remains in possession with the consent of the landlord at the end
of a lease for a fixed term or after termination of a periodic
tenancy."' The URLTA would also change Maryland law by requiring
the landlord or tenant to give 60 days' notice in writing in order to
terminate a month-to-month tenancy."' The URLTA would lengthen
the period of notice required in Maryland for a landlord to terminate a
week-to-week tenancy by requiring both the landlord and the tenant to
give ten days' notice to terminate a week-to-week tenancy.40 2
VIII. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
The common law imposed no requirement on the landlord to
mitigate damages by reletting the premises when the tenant had
abandoned40 3 the premises before the end of the lease term.40 4 When
the landlord failed to deliver possession at the commencement of the
lease term, some common law courts4 5 held that the tenant was
required to mitigate damages, while others4 6 did not.
397. Id. § 8-402(b)(5) (1974). Maryland provides that "no written agreement between a
landlord and tenant shall provide for a longer notice to be furnished by the tenant to the
landlord in order to terminate the tenancy than that required of the landlord to the
tenant in order to terminate the tenancy." Id. § 8-501 (Supp. 1975).
398. See Id. §§ 8-402(b)(1) (1974), 8-402(b)(4) (Supp. 1975), 8-402(b)(5) (1974). Under
this interpretation, if a landlord gives a month-to-month tenant, who pays rent on the
first of each month, a notice to quit on the third day of the month, the tenancy would
not terminate until the end of the following month. If the tenant vacates the premises
and ceases to pay rent after failure to give the required notice, he may be deemed to have
abandoned the premises; the landlord, after the tenant abandons, may mitigate damages
or terminate the lease. See section on Tenant's Absence from or Abandonment of the
Premises, at text accompanying notes 271-94 supra.
399. URLTA § 1.401(d). "Roomer" is defined by the URLTA as "a person occupying a
dwelling unit that does not include a toilet and either a bath tub or a shower and a
refrigerator, stove, and kitchen sink, all provided by the landlord, and where one or more
of these facilities are used in common by occupants in the structure." Id. § 1.301(12).
400. Id. § 4.301(c).
401. Id. § 4.301(b).
402. Id. § 4.301(a). The URLTA would also change Maryland law by requiring the tenant as
well as the landlord to give notice in writing. Id. §§ 4.301(a), (b).
403. See text accompanying notes 271-77 supra.
404. Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972). Failure to
mitigate damages by an aggrieved party reduces proportionately the damages to which
the aggrieved party is entitled. See 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 200 (1965).
405. E.g., McCauley v. McElroy, 199 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Huntington Easy
Payment Co. v. Parsons, 62 W. Va. 26, 57 S.E. 253 (1907).
406. E.g., Devers v. May, 124 Ky. 387, 99 S.W. 255 (1907); Wolf v. Studebaker, 65 Pa. 459
(1870).
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Both the URLTA and Maryland have changed these rules. The
URLTA states generally that an "aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate
damages. 4 °7 Maryland 40 requires an aggrieved party to mitigate
damages if the damages result from the landlord's or the tenant's
(1) Failure to supply possession of the dwelling unit;
(2) Failure or refusal to take possession at the beginning of the
term; or
(3) Termination of occupancy before the end of the term.
The Maryland statute also provides that the duty to mitigate damages
cannot be waived.40 9 Maryland, by specifically identifying certain
instances in which the duty to mitigate damages is imposed, implicitly
excludes other instances from the requirement to mitigate damages.
Mitigation of damages should be required as a matter of public policy
to keep injuries, resulting from disputes caused by breach of a duty by
the landlord or the tenant, as small as possible. The URLTA is
preferable to the Maryland statute because it broadly requires any
aggrieved party to mitigate damages.
IX. A SHORTCOMING OF THE MARYLAND COMMON LAW
AND THE URLTA: PROTECTION OF TENANTS
AGAINST CRIME
In urban areas with high crime rates, tenants in residential rental
buildings are increasingly subject to personal injury as a result of
criminal acts of violence against them in common areas and on their
premises. In addition, the tenant's personal property is subject to theft
by burglars if the landlord does not supply adequate security measures
and devices to safeguard the premises. As a result of these dangers,
tenants have become concerned with the systems and measures
provided by the landlord in common areas and in their premises to
protect their persons against injury from criminal attack and their
personal property from theft.
Some courts have recently filled a vacuum in the common law by
holding that the landlord has a duty to protect his tenants from
personal injury which may result from foreseeable criminal attack in
common areas.41 0 In addition, the tenant has been held to be entitled
407. URLTA § 1.105.
408. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-207 (1974).
409. Id. § 8-207(d).
410. In Klines v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the landlord was
held liable for injuries suffered by the tenant as a result of criminal assault in a common
hallway. The court, although holding that the landlord was not an insurer of the tenant's
safety against criminal attack, noted that there had been several attacks on tenants in
common areas under the landlord's exclusive control. Consequently, the court held that
the landlord was required to take reasonable measures to minimize these known threats
to tenants' safety. See Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
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to recover damages from his landlord for the loss of personal property
stolen from the premises when such theft was the foreseeable result of
the landlord's failure to provide adequate security measures and devices
for the premises after receiving notice of the defect in the security of
the premises.4 ' Neither Maryland nor the URLTA, however, imposes a
duty upon the landlord to protect his tenants from injury which may
result from foreseeable criminal attacks in common areas and on the
premises or to protect his tenant's personal property from a foreseeable
risk of theft by burglars.
The landlord should have a duty to protect his tenants from criminal
attack in common areas by providing reasonable security measures and
systems4" 2 where there is a foreseeable risk to tenants of criminal
attacks in these areas under his control.4" ' Imposition of such a duty
can be supported on the ground that the risk to tenants of criminal
attack in common areas in the absence of reasonable security measures
is as foreseeable as the risk to tenants of injury if the landlord fails to
maintain the common areas in proper repair.4" 4 The costs of security
measures and systems that would be borne by landlords in complying
with this duty can be recovered through rent increases, passing these
costs on to all tenants proportionately over a period of time based upon
a depreciation or amortization method. Tenants should not be
responsible for providing such security measures and systems in
common areas, since common areas are controlled by the landlord,
although subject to use by tenants. In addition, tenants would have to
rely upon voluntary contributions from all tenants to pay the costs of
security measures and systems in common areas, while the landlord can
collect these costs through the threat of eviction for non-payment of
rent.
Landlords should also be required to install reasonable security
measures for the premises of each tenant to protect the tenant's person
and property from foreseeable criminal activity. Necessary security
devices in particular premises would generally involve permanent
additions, such as bars on windows, locks on doors, or alarms; such
devices probably would be considered to be fixtures and thus not
removable by the tenant upon termination of the rental agree-
411. Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975). See Warner v.
Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974).
412. Requiring the landlord to provide reasonable security measures and systems would not
require him to assume the duties of the local police. The landlord, however, should
provide security measures which are reasonable under the circumstances. Such measures
might include: locks on all doors entering into the common areas; alarms that would be
triggered if doors or windows entering into common areas were forced open;
intercommunication devices for each premise; high intensity lighting of common areas;
security officers; and closed circuit television systems to monitor common areas.
413. Whether the landlord must comply with this duty should depend upon the characteristics
of the rental building, the geographical location of the building, and the rate of crime in
the adjacent neighborhood.
414. See text accompanying note 141 infra.
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ment4 1 If the tenant were required to install these systems or devices,
he usually would have to pay for their costs at one time. If the landlord
installed such devices, their cost could be passed on to the tenants in
possession of the premises through rent increases over a period of time,
pursuant to a depreciation or amortization method. If the landlord is
not required to provide reasonable security measures and systems in
each particular premise, tenants should be permitted to install their
own security measures, such as locks on the doors or windows. Such
action would not constitute waste.41 6 Installation of such devices could
be made subject to the reasonable approval of the landlord in order to
insure workmanlike installation; the landlord could be given the right to
install such devices if he so chooses.
X. CONCLUSION
Despite shortcomings in the URLTA, it is an excellent starting point
for legislative reformation of the common law governing landlord-ten-
ant relationships. The URLTA's application of modem contract
principles to the interpretation and construction of residential leases
can be expected to lead to "results more in accord with the legitimate
expectations of the parties and the standards. of the com-
munity ....
In certain areas, Maryland statutes, such as the retaliatory eviction
statute,418 rent escrow statute,41 9 security deposit statute, 420 and
holding-over statute,421  afford greater protection to tenants than does
the URLTA. As a consequence, the corresponding sections of the
URLTA should not be enacted to repeal such Maryland statutes. The
goal of uniform state statutes is desirable for many reasons, but
enactment of the URLTA in its entirety may be unacceptable to the
Maryland legislature because it would reverse the recent trend in
Maryland to afford increased protection to residential tenants.
415. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11.
416. See text accompanying notes 234-35 infra. The prohibition against waste by the tenant
is expressed in Section 3.101(6) of the URLTA.
417. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
418. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1975).
419. Id. § 8-211 (Supp. 1975).
420. Id. § 8-203 (1974).
421. Id. § 8-402 (Supp. 1975), amending § 8-402 (1974).
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